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SPEECH, INTENT, AND THE CHILLING EFFECT

LESLIE KENDRICK*
Speaker’s intent requirements are a common but unremarked
feature of First Amendment law. From the “actual malice” standard
for defamation to the specific-intent requirement for incitement,
many types of expression are protected or unprotected depending on
the state of mind with which they are said. To the extent that courts
and commentators have considered why speaker’s intent should
determine First Amendment protection, they have relied upon the
chilling effect. On this view, imposing strict liability for harmful
speech, such as defamatory statements, would overdeter, or chill,
valuable speech, such as true political information. Intent requirements are necessary prophylactically to provide “breathing space” for
protected speech.
This Article argues that, although the chilling effect may be a real
concern, as a justification for speaker’s intent requirements, it proves
unsatisfactory. It cannot explain existing intent requirements, and
the difficulties of measuring and remedying chilling effects cast
doubt on whether they could ever provide the sole justification for the
choice of one intent requirement over another. The inadequacy of the
chilling effect leaves the problem of speaker’s intent in need of further
explanation and raises more general concerns about the use of
deterrence-based arguments in constitutional law.
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INTRODUCTION
Although much has been written about the role of government
purpose in First Amendment analysis,1 remarkably little has been
said about speaker’s intent.2 And yet, across many areas, First
Amendment law determines the protection of speech by reference to
1. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 13-123
(2005); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2 to -7, at 789-825 (2d ed.
1988); Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech:
Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 59-61 (2000); John Hart
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496-1502 (1975); Daniel A. Farber, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 739-47 (1980);
Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 650-53 (2002); Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414-16 (1996); Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination
Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 235-54 (2012); Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust:
Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1347, 1350-55 (2006); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 116-17, 126-27, 131-33 (1981); Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental
Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: A Motive-Based Rationalization of the
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 401, 415-20 (1995); Paul B. Stephan III,
The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 214-31 (1982); Geoffrey
R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 227-33
(1983); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277,
1301-11 (2005).
2. See Larry Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker’s Intent, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 21, 25
(1995) [hereinafter Alexander, Speaker’s Intent] (discussing speaker’s intent generally); Larry
Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548 (1989) [hereinafter Alexander, Low
Value Speech] (same); Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment:
The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 217-23 (same).
Some works have offered valuable discussions of particular intent requirements. See KENT
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 47-48 (1989) (discussing speaker’s
intent in crime-related speech); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354-55 (1991) (examining false speech); Cass R. Sunstein,
Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 606 (discussing pornography);
Jonathan D. Varat, Lecture, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2006) (discussing false speech);
Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1174 (2005) (examining
speech that contributes to criminal activity); see also Vincent Blasi, Lecture, Shouting “Fire!”
in a Theater and Vilifying Corn Dealers, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 535, 538-39 (2011) (suggesting
that John Stuart Mill’s conception of incitement took speaker’s intent into account). For a rare
account that brings together governmental and speaker purposes, see Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1777-80 (2003).
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the state of mind, or intent, of the speaker.3 Incitement, for example,
is speech that intends and is likely to produce imminent lawless
action.4 The constitutional standards for defamation famously turn
on the state of mind of the speaker.5 Punishment for distributing
obscenity or child pornography requires proof of recklessness or
knowledge as to the factual contents of the material.6 In these and
other areas, a speaker’s state of mind determines the status of his
expression under the First Amendment.
Despite the frequency of these intent requirements, the reasons
behind them are not clear. The harm or value inherent in expression
is unlikely to change with the state of mind with which it is said.
Why, then, should the same statement be treated differently depending on the speaker’s intent? This puzzle is rarely remarked
upon, let alone analyzed.
To the extent that the Supreme Court has answered the question,
it has relied on the chilling effect.7 The few commentators to address
the issue have also concluded that the chilling effect is the only
3. I use the term “intent” to mean a concern with the speaker’s state of mind in the same
way in which the criminal law uses the terms “mens rea” and “mental state,” and sometimes
the terms “general intent” and “intent.” Some of the requirements at issue in First
Amendment law are “specific-intent” requirements, in that they demand an intent to do a
certain thing or to bring about a particular result. Others involve lesser mental states, such
as knowledge or recklessness. In referring to “intent requirements,” I am referring to all such
state-of-mind requirements.
4. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); see also infra notes 32-34
and accompanying text.
5. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (protecting false and
defamatory statements about private figures when said without fault); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (imposing an “actual malice” requirement of knowledge
or recklessness with respect to falsity for false and defamatory statements about public
officials in their official job duties); see also infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
6. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
152-53 (1959); see also infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
7. The Supreme Court has also employed the term “breathing space.” Sullivan, 376 U.S.
at 271-72. Use of the term “chill” first occurred in one of the Communist-affiliation cases,
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), but the Court
identified the problem in earlier cases without using the magic words. See, e.g., Am. Commc’ns
Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950). The term “chilling effect” first occurred in a case
examining Florida’s efforts to compel disclosure of the NAACP’s membership out of a
purported concern that it was being infiltrated by Communists. See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1963). In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75
(1964), the Court said that known lies were “at odds with the premises of democratic
government,” but it has not elaborated on this idea and appeared to contradict it recently in
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012).
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normatively legitimate reason for constitutional speech protection
to turn on speaker’s intent.8 On the chilling effect account, the
intent of the speaker has no inherent relation to the protection of
the speech: speech is protected or unprotected based upon its value
or harm. Intent requirements are useful, however, in ensuring that
regulation of unprotected expression does not incidentally deter
protected expression. For example, on a chilling effect account, all
false and defamatory statements are, on their own merits, unprotected.9 But allowing liability for all such statements might deter
true speech because people might hesitate to speak unless they are
certain about the truth of their statements. Protected, true speech
will thus be “chilled” by the regulation of unprotected, false speech.
One possible way to prevent this chilling effect is to give some
false and defamatory statements “strategic protection.”10 Protecting
negligent and good-faith false statements will encourage uncertain
speakers to make true statements. By drawing the actual line between protected and unprotected speech prophylactically, courts
create “breathing space” for expression that is truly protected.11
Speaker’s intent is simply an expedient basis on which to draw the
line.
This chilling effect account holds some appeal. It explains a variety of First Amendment intent requirements with a single theory.
That theory neatly resolves the puzzle of why speaker’s intent
should matter by concluding that, in fact, it does not, except as a
convenient way to resolve other concerns. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has explained its interest in speaker’s intent in chilling effect
terms.12
But there are reasons to doubt the chilling effect account. A claim
of a chilling effect necessarily rests upon suppositions about the
8. See Alexander, Speaker’s Intent, supra note 2, at 25; Alexander, Low Value Speech,
supra note 2, at 548; Schauer, supra note 2, at 217 & n.67.
9. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest
in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.” (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S.
at 270)). See generally Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling
the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978) (analyzing the mechanics and justifications
of chilling effect doctrine).
10. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
11. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
12. See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
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deterrent effects of law. These suppositions rest in turn upon
predictions about the behavior of speakers under counterfactual
conditions. Meanwhile, the selection of a remedy for chilling—such
as an intent requirement—rests on similar predictions about the
remedy’s speech-protective effects.13 In short, both the detection of
a problem and the imposition of a remedy involve intractable
empirical difficulties.
In the case of speaker’s intent, these difficulties seriously undermine the chilling effect account. Though at first blush the existing
intent requirements might seem convincing as products of rough
empirical surmise, upon further scrutiny they often fail to persuade
even by this standard. The existing empirical literature confirms the
implausibility of the current requirements and illustrates the challenge of converting concerns about chilling into reliably precise and
accurate legal rules.14
This is not to say that the chilling effect is not a real phenomenon.
Nor is it to say that the chilling effect should play no role in the
development of First Amendment rules. After all, intuition suggests
that some legal rules will chill speech. The further a law encroaches
on protected speech, the greater the risk that such speech will be
penalized. The more likely speakers are to be penalized, the less
they will speak. I do not deny this basic intuition. Moreover, First
Amendment law should accommodate this intuition. The First
Amendment is the appropriate place to acknowledge fears about
chilled speech, and it would be unsound to deny such fears simply
on the ground that they cannot be measured.
The problem comes in translating a legitimate concern about
chilling into a legal rule. Our best instincts about the existence of
chilling may be wide of the mark and, in any case, must usually
remain a matter of surmise. Likewise, the imposition of a remedy—
the choice of one intent requirement over another, not to mention
over all other possible remedial rules—is likely to require more
refinement than the available evidence will allow. Even when a
constitutional remedy seems clearly preferable to the dangers of
ignoring chilling, these uncertainties remain. They render it all but
inevitable that the chilling effect will be invoked inconsistently
13. See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
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across cases whose outcomes cannot be reconciled and whose accuracy must remain largely a matter of faith.
The significance of this conclusion is twofold. First, to the extent
that speaker’s intent presents a puzzle within First Amendment
law, the chilling effect leaves the puzzle unsolved. Reliance on the
chilling effect cannot render the existing intent requirements
consistent with each other.15 Furthermore, given the difficulties of
measuring chilling and the seemingly subtle differences in the
deterrent effects of existing intent requirements, the chilling effect
is too weak to serve as the sole justification for the choice of one
intent requirement over another.16 If certain intent requirements
have strong intuitive appeal, it is worth exploring whether this is
because they find support in other justifications.
Second, the problems with the chilling effect account of intent
requirements suggest a broader difficulty. Other applications of the
chilling effect, and indeed other deterrence-based justifications in
constitutional law and elsewhere, may be subject to similar empirical quandaries. In the constitutional context, courts and scholars
have justified rules from qualified immunity17 to the exclusionary
rule18 on the basis of predictions about deterrence of unwanted
conduct or overdeterrence of valuable activities. If our empirical
assumptions have little demonstrable basis, and if those assumptions are the primary or sole justification for a constitutional rule,
then the legitimacy of that rule ought to be a matter of some
concern. The problem of speaker’s intent offers an opportunity to
consider responses to this issue.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I shows the pervasiveness of speaker’s intent requirements in First Amendment law and
then outlines the chilling effect account of these requirements. Part
II describes the chilling effect as a product of unsubstantiated
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 351 & n.16 (2000) (discussing and
providing sources for the conception of qualified immunity as protection against the chilling
of valuable activity by government officials).
18. See Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled
Basis” Rather than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 579-606, 627-45
(1983) (discussing the exclusionary rule’s justification as a deterrent on police misconduct);
Levinson, supra note 17, at 417 (same).
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empirical judgment and argues that, even on those terms, it cannot
justify existing First Amendment intent requirements. Part III
argues that the chilling effect account fares no better when subjected to serious empirical inquiry. Finally, Part IV offers potential
responses to the weakness of the chilling effect account.
I. INTENT AND THE CHILLING EFFECT
To assess the chilling effect as a justification, it is important first
to identify the intent requirements it is supposed to justify and then
to set out the chilling effect account of those requirements.
A. Intent Requirements in First Amendment Law
Scholars have generally overlooked the prevalence of intent requirements in First Amendment law. When they do remark upon
such requirements, they treat them as infrequent outliers.19 This is
decidedly not the case.
A discussion of First Amendment intent requirements calls for
some orientation within free speech doctrine and principles. Within
the scope of the First Amendment,20 the most important factor is the
government’s reason for regulating.21 If the government is regulating activity for reasons other than concern about the activity’s
message, the regulation is highly likely to pass First Amendment
muster.22 For example, a law regulating parades out of concerns
about noise and traffic would likely be upheld. If, however, the government is regulating out of some concern about the message being
19. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 2, at 216-24.
20. Some laws implicate the First Amendment, and some do not. Fred Schauer’s notion
of the “coverage” of the First Amendment captures this point. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769-74 (2004). In Schauer’s view, a great deal of regulation of expression
—such as insider trading, price fixing, and criminal solicitation—occurs outside the scope, or
coverage, of the First Amendment. Id. at 1770-71. Because my interest here is with intent
requirements in various First Amendment standards, I am by definition working within the
scope of the First Amendment.
21. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-3, at 794 (describing First Amendment doctrine);
Kagan, supra note 1, at 413-14 (same); see also Alexander, Speaker’s Intent, supra note 2, at
22 (making a normative case for this position); Ely, supra note 1, at 1496-97 (same).
22. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-2, at 791-92.
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expressed, a serious First Amendment issue arises.23 For example,
a decision to prohibit a parade because of its controversial message
would be deeply suspect. A law of this kind must either survive
strict scrutiny or it must be found to regulate one of a set of categories of unprotected expression. If it does not, the law is invalid.24
As this sketch makes clear, a great deal of First Amendment
analysis may take place before there is an opportunity to consider
a speaker’s state of mind. The first order of business is the government’s intentions, so to speak, not those of the speaker. If the
government is not regulating for message-related reasons, the law
is likely valid; if it is regulating for impermissible message-related
reasons, the law is invalid. In neither case does the speaker’s state
of mind enter the analysis. It is only when the government plausibly
may regulate for message-related reasons that the focus turns from
the government’s purpose to other factors, including the speaker’s
state of mind. Thus, my argument here concerns (1) the unprotected
categories of speech and (2) the conditions under which other
message-related regulations may survive strict scrutiny.
1. Unprotected Categories
The Supreme Court has recognized several categories of speech
that the First Amendment does not protect, such as defamation, incitement, threats, obscenity, child pornography, fraud, and fighting
words.25 The Court has also accorded commercial speech a lower
level of protection, typically described as intermediate scrutiny.26
Virtually all of these categories are defined by reference to the
speaker’s state of mind.
Defamation: At common law, speakers could be held strictly liable
for false and defamatory statements.27 Beginning with New York
23. See, e.g., id.
24. See, e.g., id. § 12-2 to -3, at 790-92.
25. For a partial list, see United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).
26. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
27. See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:42 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2012).
Although a series of privileges shielded speakers from liability in certain instances, the threat
of liability was real and avoiding it depended upon proving that a privilege applied. In some
jurisdictions, falsity, malice, or damages could be presumed. For example, the court instructed
the Alabama jury in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that the statements at issue were
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Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court modified the common law
with intent requirements.28 Currently, false and defamatory statements about a public official or public figure regarding a matter of
public concern are unprotected only when said with “actual malice,”
meaning that the speaker either knew the statement was false or
was gravely reckless toward this risk.29 False and defamatory statements about private figures on matters of public concern require
negligence for compensatory damages and actual malice for presumed or punitive damages.30 False and defamatory statements
about anyone regarding a matter of private concern may be governed by more permissive common law standards.31
Incitement: After decades of wrestling with the line between protected and unprotected political advocacy,32 in Brandenburg v. Ohio
the Supreme Court defined unprotected incitement as “advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation” that is “directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.”33 The Supreme Court has glossed the phrase “directed

libelous per se, meaning that both falsity and malice were presumed, and that damages too
could be presumed. 376 U.S. 254, 262 (1964). The only questions for the jury were whether
the defendant had published the statements and whether they concerned the plaintiff. Id.; see
also ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 34-35
(1991).
28. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
29. Id. The Court quickly extended the same reasoning to criminal libel. Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). “Recklessness” in this context means that the speaker must
“in fact entertain[ ] serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
30. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41, 350 (1974). Gertz also defined what
constituted a public figure. See id. at 345, 351.
31. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985)
(plurality opinion). In Dun & Bradstreet, the plaintiff was permitted to recover presumed and
punitive damages under a negligence standard. Id. at 760-61. After Dun & Bradstreet, it is
not entirely clear whether Gertz’s prohibition on strict liability remains, or whether a state
could impose liability without fault for statements on matters of private concern.
32. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
33. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). While some previous incarnations of the
constitutional standard were never overruled, Brandenburg is generally taken to draw the
definitive line between protected advocacy and unprotected incitement. See, e.g., Thomas
Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 656-57 (2009).
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to inciting” as imposing a specific-intent requirement.34 Thus, only
advocacy intended to produce imminent lawless action qualifies as
unprotected incitement.
Threats: The unprotected category of “true threats” is confined to
“those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
to a particular individual or group of individuals.”35 The Court
specified that “[t]he speaker need not actually intend to carry out
the threat,” but he must have intended to communicate a threatening statement.36
Obscenity: At first glance, speaker’s intent seems irrelevant to
obscenity: no part of the three-prong Miller test turns on the intentions of the defendant.37 But in Smith v. California, the Supreme
Court held that criminal liability requires that distributors of
34. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam) (“[S]ince there was no
evidence, or rational inference from the import of the language, that his words were intended
to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those words could not be punished by
the State on the ground that they had a ‘tendency to lead to violence.’”).
A few critics do not read Brandenburg to involve speaker’s intent. See Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of
History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 755 (1975); Schauer, supra note 2, at 218-19. Like Gunther,
Schauer argues that Brandenburg should be read as requiring “a ‘direct’ encouragement” of
a lawless act, where “direct” refers “to the literal or explicit meaning of the words of
incitement.” Id. at 218. But in addition to the Supreme Court’s having applied Brandenburg
as requiring intent, an overwhelming majority of courts and commentators have read it the
same way, as Schauer acknowledges. Id. at 220 n.72; see, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA
AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 10:23 (2011 & Supp. 2012); WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE,
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 107 n.43 (1984); Alexander, Speaker’s Intent,
supra note 2, at 25; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 2008, 2017 (2002); Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First
Amendments, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 971, 1015 (2010); Frank R. Strong, Fifty Years of “Clear
and Present Danger”: From Schenck to Brandenburg—and Beyond, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 42;
Volokh, supra note 2, at 1191.
35. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 359-60; see also id. at 360 (“[A] prohibition on true threats protect[s] individuals
from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting
people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Schauer, supra note 2, at 216-18 (discussing Virginia v. Black).
37. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“The basic guidelines for the trier of
fact must be: (a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ...; (b) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.” (citations omitted)).
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obscenity have acted with knowledge or recklessness regarding the
factual contents of obscene materials.38
Child Pornography: Likewise, the definition of child pornography
at first appears to have nothing to do with a speaker’s state of
mind.39 But at least with regard to distributors and possessors of
child pornography, the Supreme Court has required proof of knowledge of 40 or recklessness toward41 the subjects’ minor status.
Fraud: Analogizing to defamation, the Supreme Court has held
that liability for fraud must involve “exacting proof requirements.”42
The Court has upheld a state law requiring proof that the defendant
knew a statement was false and intended to deceive, and the Court
has emphasized that the mere existence of a false statement is
insufficient ground for liability.43
Commercial Speech: Intermediate protection for commercial
speech is in one regard strict liability and in another regard
seemingly geared to speakers’ intentions.44 On one hand, false or
38. 361 U.S. 147, 149, 152-55 (1959) (invalidating conviction when law lacked scienter
requirement); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643-45 (1968) (affirming conviction when law required that defendant have “reason to know” of factual contents); Mishkin
v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1966) (affirming conviction when state law had been
construed to require knowledge of factual contents). This scienter requirement extends only
to knowledge of the factual contents of expression, not to knowledge of its legal status as
obscene. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974).
39. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (defining child pornography as sexually
explicit depictions of actual minors).
40. Id. at 765 (requiring scienter to impose criminal liability as is required for obscenity
prosecution); see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (interpreting a federal statute to require distributors’ knowledge of minor status, as compelled by
First Amendment reasons as well as principles of criminal liability).
The Supreme Court has suggested that scienter may not be required for producers of child
pornography, as opposed to distributors or possessors. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 76
n.5. Most circuit courts have relied upon this dictum to reject any mens rea requirement for
producers, though the Ninth Circuit has required an affirmative defense of mistake-of-age.
See United States v. Humphrey, 608 F.3d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 2010) (describing various circuit
courts’ requirements and distinguishing them from the Ninth Circuit).
41. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 115 (1990) (holding that an Ohio court’s construal
of a child pornography statute to require recklessness satisfied Ferber’s scienter requirement).
42. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003); cf. Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 & n.19 (1984) (observing “kinship”
between the Sullivan standard and the typical common law standard for fraud).
43. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 606, 620-21.
44. Commercial speech inhabits an intermediate tier of protection. Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980). False and misleading
commercial speech is unprotected, as is commercial speech regarding illegal activity. Id. at
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misleading commercial speech is completely unprotected without
regard for the speaker’s state of mind.45 On the other hand, commercial speech garners lesser protection than other speech in large
part because it is economically motivated and thus “there is little
likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation.”46 On the Court’s
hypothesis, commercial speakers say what they do out of economic
motivation, and thus economic interest informs their intentions in
speaking. In this way, speaker’s intent, while irrelevant to the
status of false and misleading commercial speech, arguably helps to
define the entire category.
Of course, the fact that commercial speech is economically motivated is not alone a sufficient reason for according it lesser
protection. Some economically motivated expression has full First
Amendment protection, including the advertisement at issue in
Sullivan.47 But the question is not whether economic motivation is
a sufficient basis for according commercial-speech status. In none of
the other categories I have mentioned is the speaker’s state of mind
the only feature that defines an unprotected category. The question
is whether economic motivation is a necessary condition for commercial speech. The Court has suggested that it may be.48
563-64. Other commercial speech receives intermediate protection, wherein a regulation must
directly advance a substantial government interest by means that are no more extensive than
necessary. Id. at 566.
45. The Federal Trade Commission Act, for example, imposes liability for deceptive
advertising without regard for whether the speaker intended to deceive. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006);
see, e.g., FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005); FTC v. Amy
Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 573 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 710,
712 (8th Cir. 1976); FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[S]ince the
purpose of the statute is not to punish the wrongdoer but to protect the public, the cardinal
factor is the probable effect which the advertiser’s handiwork will have upon the eye and mind
of the reader.”).
46. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
n.24 (1976); see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (explaining that commercial speech,
as the “offspring of economic self-interest,” is less susceptible to chill).
47. See Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989) (citing the Sullivan example); see also
Schauer, supra note 2, at 221 n.78.
48. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983) (holding that the
economic motivation for the printing of a pamphlet, though insufficient in itself to make the
pamphlet commercial speech, was one of a “combination of ... characteristics” to render it
such); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (explaining that the economic motivation of
commercial speech justifies its lesser protection because this motivation makes it less
susceptible to chilling). But see Schauer, supra note 2, at 221 (“That someone who advertises
a product does not possess the profit-seeking motivation that partly justifies the lower level
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2. Other Examples
Other cases afford additional examples in which speaker’s intent
matters to the protection of expression.
Communist affiliation: A long line of cases considered the conditioning of government employment and other benefits on lack of
Communist ties. For a period, the Court allowed benefits to be
denied only to people who knew that the organization to which they
belonged advocated the violent overthrow of the government.49 In
later cases, the Court required both “knowledge of the [Communist]
Party’s unlawful purposes and specific intent to further its unlawful
aims.”50
Invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress:
The Court has held that liability for expression under both these
tort actions is limited by the Sullivan actual malice standard. At
least in the case of a newsworthy plaintiff, a successful claim for
invasion of privacy predicated on a false statement requires a
showing that the defendant acted with actual malice.51 A public

of protection does not change the approach that would be used to determine whether the
material itself can be controlled, or whether the purveyor of the product may be sanctioned.”).
Alexander appears to recognize, and reject, this implication of the commercial speech
doctrine. See Alexander, Low Value Speech, supra note 2, at 548-49 (“[T]he ‘value’ of ‘buy a
Chrysler’ does not decline when its author is Lee Iacocca rather than Ralph Nader.”). But his
position is complex. He reads Virginia Pharmacy as making profit motive irrelevant to the
“intrinsic value of the speech” but says that it may nevertheless be relevant to constitutional
protection “in the few situations in which profit motive might affect coerciveness or the
potential for fraud and deception.” See Lawrence Alexander, Speech in the Local Marketplace:
Implications of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.
for Local Regulatory Power, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 357, 374 (1977).
49. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485,
494-95 (1952); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 189-91 (1952); Garner v. Bd. of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723-28 (1951); Gerende v. Bd. of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56, 56-57 (1951);
Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412-13 (1950).
50. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606-07 (1967); see id. at 606 (“Mere knowing
membership without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of an organization is not
a constitutionally adequate basis for exclusion.”); see also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11,
17 (1966) (same); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228 (1961) (referring to constitutional
principles in interpreting the Smith Act to target only active Communist Party members with
guilty knowledge and intent); cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 919-20
(1982) (noting that civil liability may only be imposed when the individual belonged to a group
with unlawful goals and had the intent to further those goals).
51. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-89 (1967).
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figure’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must
meet the same standard.52
Criminal instruction: Courts and lawmakers have also struggled
with speech that instructs listeners on how to commit crimes.53 The
Fourth Circuit, for example, concluded that tort liability for an
instructional manual entitled Hit Man rested on whether its publishers intended to enable crime.54 A federal law punishing distribution of bomb-making instructions requires proof that the defendant
intended that the information be used in furtherance of a federal
crime of violence.55 Originally, the proposed legislation did not include a specific-intent requirement.56 It was modified after a 1997
Department of Justice Report, compiled at Congress’s behest,57 concluded that the First Amendment required specific intent.58
None of this is to say that the First Amendment always takes
speaker’s intent into consideration. For example, the unprotected
category of fighting words, to the extent that it still exists, appears
to require neither intent to insult nor intent to provoke a fight.59
Similarly, in the campaign finance context, the Court has held that
the distinction between express advocacy and issue advocacy does
not involve the intent of the speaker but rather the objective
meaning of the expression.60 In recent years, the Supreme Court has
had a somewhat complex response to two invitations to impose
intent requirements. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the

52. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
53. On criminal instruction, see generally Volokh, supra note 2, and Leslie Kendrick,
Note, A Test for Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 VA. L. REV. 1973 (2005).
54. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 266 (4th Cir. 1997).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2) (2006).
56. See Act of Aug. 17, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-54, 113 Stat. 398, 398-99 (adding subsection
(p) to § 842).
57. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 709,
110 Stat. 1214, 1297 (requiring the DOJ to conduct a study and prepare a report).
58. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF BOMBMAKING
INFORMATION, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS13089.
59. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940) (stating that one may be guilty
of breach of the peace “if he commit acts or make statements likely to provoke violence and
disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuality be intended,” while suggesting this
principle passes constitutional muster so long as it is limited to certain classes of speech
(emphasis added)).
60. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 466-68 (2007); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 43-44 (1976).

1648

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1633

Court upheld a law prohibiting knowing provision of material
support to terrorist organizations.61 The Court saw no constitutional
need to construe the law to reach only intentional support of such
organizations,62 but in passing it suggested that the knowledge
requirement helped to make the statute “carefully drawn.”63 In
United States v. Alvarez, a plurality of the Court concluded that the
false statements at issue were entirely protected, at least so long as
they were not said “for the purpose of material gain.”64 The Court
thus declined to impose a requirement of knowledge or recklessness
while seemingly reiterating that fraudulent intent renders false
speech unprotected. Whatever the import of these more recent
cases, the fact remains that, in many areas, the law treats otherwise
identical speech differently depending on the speaker’s state of
mind.
B. The Chilling Effect Account of Speaker’s Intent
Of the existing First Amendment intent requirements, the
Supreme Court has explicitly invoked the chilling effect to explain
defamation,65 obscenity,66 commercial speech,67 fraud,68 invasion of
privacy,69 intentional infliction of emotional distress,70 and the
Communist-affiliation cases.71 Other requirements, most prominently specific intent for incitement and true threats, have not
expressly relied on chilling.72 Meanwhile, some scholars have argued
61. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010).
62. Id. at 2718.
63. Id. at 2723.
64. 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (plurality opinion).
65. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
66. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 148-50 (1959). To the extent that the Court has
relied upon Smith and other obscenity cases in imposing the same scienter requirement for
child pornography, it may have relied implicitly upon the chilling effect in that context as
well. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982).
67. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980).
68. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003).
69. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967).
70. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
71. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
72. Indeed, the test for incitement began its development long before the Court first
invoked the chilling effect. Though Brandenburg itself offers no justification for the intent
requirement, earlier cases likened incitement to criminal attempt. See infra note 245 and
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that, normatively speaking, any First Amendment intent requirement can be justified only by the chilling effect.73
The term “chilling effect” refers to a claim that an otherwise
legitimate regulation has the incidental effect of deterring—or
chilling—benign activity, in this case protected expression.74 Of
course, rules are generally understood to have deterrent effects on
conduct. A law against murder, one hopes, deters murder. An obscenity law is thought to deter obscene expression. Such an effect
would not be a chilling effect as the term is typically employed.75
Instead, the term “chilling effect” refers to the spillover effects of
laws on benign conduct outside their scope. For example, an obscenity law that inhibited nonobscene expression would exert a chilling
effect.76 “Chilling” denotes overdeterrence of benign conduct that
occurs incidentally to a law’s legitimate purpose or scope.
1. Why Chilling Matters
Overdeterrence of benign conduct is usually a policy matter, not
a constitutional one. Moreover, many ordinary legal rules, such as
criminal and tort rules, are taken to represent an acceptable
balance of deterrence of undesired conduct and chilling of benign
conduct.77 The premise of the chilling effect, however, is that when
the conduct in question is speech, the balance represented by
ordinary legal rules is subject to judicial review and may well be

accompanying text. In Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003), the Virginia threat
statute included a specific-intent requirement, which the Supreme Court constitutionalized
with no explicit justification. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 216-18.
73. See Alexander, Speaker’s Intent, supra note 2, at 25; Schauer, supra note 2, at 217-23.
74. As Schauer notes, the term “chilling effect” may denote unwelcome deterrent effects
with respect to any rights or values, but it originated in and remains closely associated with
the First Amendment context. Schauer, supra note 9, at 686-87 n.10.
75. See, e.g., id. at 693; see also Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 745-46
(2012) (using the term “deterrence” to denote deterrence of harmful acts and “chilling” to
denote deterrence of benign acts).
76. See Schauer, supra note 9, at 693.
77. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 75, at 745-46.
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found wanting.78 Traditional tort principles must be rejected,79 as
must the regular operation of the criminal law.80
The question is why the chilling of expression is a constitutional
concern warranting the review and alteration of generally acceptable rules. The answer must depend, as most First Amendment
arguments do, on the contention that expression is special in some
way.81 The chilling effect is of constitutional moment because protected expression is a particularly valuable activity toward which
legal rules must show special solicitude. Professor Frederick
Schauer, for example, has argued that chilling effect arguments are
based on a conception of free expression as an affirmative value.82
On this view, the First Amendment is “based on the assumption,
perhaps unprovable, that the uninhibited exchange of information,
the active search for truth, and the open criticism of government are
positive virtues.”83 Accordingly, the government is under a duty not
only to refrain from regulating protected expression but also to
promote it.84 At the same time, freedom of expression is also a
preferred value, such that, when it conflicts with other state values
—such as the interest in regulating unprotected expression—it must
receive more weight.85 Hence the chilling effect of an otherwise
legitimate law becomes a matter for judicial review and a likely
cause for invalidation.86
78. See Schauer, supra note 9, at 685.
79. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (intentional infliction
of emotional distress); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (invasion of privacy); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation).
80. Compare United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1922) (upholding a law
imposing strict liability for the improper sale of a controlled substance), and People v.
Commons, 148 P.2d 724, 730 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1944) (allowing prosecution under
a Los Angeles ordinance imposing strict liability for carrying a dangerous weapon in a car
without a permit), with Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-54 (1959) (invalidating a Los
Angeles ordinance imposing strict liability on a bookseller in possession of obscene material).
81. See generally Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284
(1983).
82. Schauer, supra note 9, at 691.
83. Id. at 693 (footnotes omitted).
84. Id. at 691 (“[W]e are concerned with encouraging speech almost as much as with
preventing its restriction by the government.”).
85. See id. at 703-05; see also, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 891 (2010)
(“First Amendment standards, however, must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting
rather than stifling speech.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
86. See Schauer, supra note 9, at 694.
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Schauer’s view appears to capture the operating ideas beneath
many scholarly and judicial conceptions of the chilling effect.87 Some
might not go so far as to argue that the government has a duty to
promote expression, rather than a duty to avoid deterring it.88 But
even so, the basic idea remains that protected expression has special
value, which generates special solicitude against chilling.
It should also be clear that the use of the terms “deterrence” and
“chilling” here does not imply an efficiency-based theory of free expression. Some scholars, such as Professor Daniel Farber, have
advanced an efficiency-based view according to which expression
requires special treatment not because it is superior to other goods
but because it has some attributes of a public good.89 One result of
this view is that speech requires special subsidies, such as constitutional protection against chilling.90 An interest in chilling may thus
be generated from efficiency-based premises, but it hardly equates
with them. Anyone who thinks that expression has affirmative
value—for its role in democratic self-government, for its facilitation
of autonomy, or for whatever other reason—will regard an interest
87. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[P]unishment of error
runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize that a rule of strict liability that
compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may
lead to intolerable self-censorship.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
(“[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”); David
A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422 (1975) (explaining
constitutional libel law as attempting to reduce press self-censorship in order to ensure
vigorous public debate).
88. For example, Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340-41, and Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278-79, protect
against chilling without endorsing a positive state obligation to promote expression. But it is
difficult to conceive of protection against chilling as anything other than a subsidy of protected
expression. And it is difficult to see why the government would have a duty to subsidize
protected expression in one context and not others. The issue is controversial, however, and
tangential to the argument here. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that expression
has special value that, at the least, places an obligation on the government to avoid chilling
it through regulation.
89. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Commentary, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice
and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 569-70 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Free
Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 19-24 (1986). Farber argues that
speech need not be more valuable than other activities in absolute terms. Farber, supra, at
560. Instead, it may be special because a high proportion of its value is social rather than
private, and producers are likely to have suboptimal incentives to produce it. Id. at 559-60.
90. See Farber, supra note 89, at 569-70.
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in chilling as consistent with, if not required by, her conception of
freedom of expression.
2. How Chilling Works
The question arises why legal rules not directed at protected
speech might nevertheless chill such speech. Chilling may arise
from different sources, foremost among which is uncertainty in the
legal process.91 Uncertainty may stem from ambiguous rules or
erroneous applications. Either of these may make a speaker fear
that he will be held liable for speech that should properly be protected. The closer his speech is to the line between protected and
unprotected, the more pronounced this uncertainty will be.92 Given
the existence of both ambiguity and error, would-be speakers of
marginal statements might well decide that they would prefer not
to speak rather than to risk liability. Speech that is actually protected will therefore be chilled.93
It is worthwhile to examine this description in more detail. The
mechanisms of chilling are diverse, and some so distinct as to have
their own labels. The most prominent examples are vagueness and
overbreadth.94 The doctrine of void-for-vagueness is partly explained
on chilling grounds.95 A vague law creates uncertainty as to its
91. See Schauer, supra note 9, at 694. Although legal uncertainty is an important source
of chilling, it is not the only one. If chilling is objectionable because it constitutes a negative
incidental effect on protected expression, it is important to recognize that all regulations
impose some incidental burden on protected expression. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 17
(“[A]ll laws affect what gets said, by whom, to whom, and with what effect.” (emphasis
omitted)).
For example, an ordinance against outdoor burning, although directed at preventing fires,
has a detrimental incidental effect on certain symbolic conduct. Cf. United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968) (upholding a prohibition on draft-card burning justified by
administrative interests). Similarly, an antileafleting ordinance directed at reducing litter
may well have a detrimental incidental effect on protected expression. In their implication of
speech as an affirmative value, such effects seem no different from the unintended
detrimental effects of a law directed at unprotected expression. See infra Part II.B.3.
92. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 9, at 696 (arguing that chilling is greatest at the margins
of protection).
93. See id. at 694.
94. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-33, at 1037-39; see also Farber, supra note 89, at
570 & n.67 (discussing vagueness and overbreadth as instances of concern about chilling).
95. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); TRIBE, supra note
1, § 12-31, at 1033-34. Vagueness also creates problems of fair notice and potential for
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scope; speakers who would otherwise engage in protected speech
accordingly self-censor. Although vagueness is a general due process issue, its special significance in the First Amendment area is
consistent with the conception of free speech as an affirmative
value.96
Similarly, one chief explanation for the First Amendment doctrine
of overbreadth rests on the chilling effect. An overbroad law is
invalid not because it incidentally chills protected expression but
because it directly reaches protected expression: hence the term
“overbroad.” The chilling effect comes in as one explanation for why
unprotected speakers—those who would have been reached by a
properly drawn law—nevertheless may challenge the overbroad
law.97 They may do so, according to this account, because the law is
chilling would-be speakers of protected expression who stay silent
to avoid prosecution but thereby lose the opportunity to challenge
the law.98 The overbroad law essentially exerts a chilling effect on
its own appropriate judicial review, the remedy to which is a special
standing rule.99
But chilling also arises outside the context of these doctrines. A
law that is not void for vagueness may still contain ambiguities, and
even the clearest rule may be applied in error. These circumstances
may make speakers uncertain of a law’s application. This uncertainty may translate into a variety of risks, any of which may cause
a speaker to remain silent. For example, a speaker may be deterred

arbitrary or discriminatory applications. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
96. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109; TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-31, at 1033-34.
97. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973); 13A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.94, at 824-25 (3d ed. 2008).
98. See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 n.19
(1984) (“[W]here the statute unquestionably attaches sanctions to protected conduct, the
likelihood that the statute will deter that conduct is ordinarily sufficiently great to justify an
overbreadth attack.”).
99. This is, of course, not the only account of overbreadth, and I do not endorse it here. If
anything, my arguments about the weakness of the chilling effect as a First Amendment
justification militate against the standing account of overbreadth and in favor of the
substantive account. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1989) (suggesting the
existence of a substantive right not to be subject to an invalid statute); WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 97, § 3531.94, at 801 (same); Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1-2 (same).
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• by the risk of wrongful criminal conviction and sanction;100
• by the risk of wrongful liability in tort for damages or other
civil remedies;101
• by the risk of losing benefits to which he is entitled;102
• by the litigation costs of defending himself in criminal, civil, or
administrative procedures, regardless of their outcomes;103
• by the personal and reputational costs of defending against a
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, regardless of its
outcome;104
• by the costs of obtaining legal advice prior to speaking;105 or
• by the threat of investigation or surveillance, whether or not it
results in legal proceedings.106

100. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 153-54 (1959). But see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971) (rejecting standing
of plaintiffs to seek federal injunction of state law when they were not facing prosecution but
allegedly felt chilled by the risk of sanction).
101. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
102. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (holding that predicating a
government benefit on loyalty oath may chill protected association).
103. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984) (claiming that Sullivan budgeted for
the chilling effect of litigation costs in rejecting the claim for an amended jurisdictional
standard for defamation suits); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (rejecting the claim
that the chilling effect of libel litigation costs required a change in discovery rules); see also
Farber, supra note 89, at 569 (recognizing litigation costs as a potential cause of chilling);
Schauer, supra note 9, at 711-12 (same).
104. Compare Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (concluding that “the cost, anxiety, and
inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution” did not justify a
federal injunction against the enforcement of a state law in an ongoing prosecution), with
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (“So long as the statute remains available to
the State the threat of prosecutions of protected expression is a real and substantial one. Even
the prospect of ultimate failure of such prosecutions by no means dispels their chilling effect
on protected expression.”).
105. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010) (“The First Amendment does
not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney.”).
106. Compare NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (holding
that exposure of NAACP membership lists during investigation would impermissibly chill free
association), with Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1972) (rejecting standing of individuals
claiming that existence of Army civilian surveillance program chilled their free expression and
association), and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-94 (1972) (rejecting as speculative
claims about the chilling effect of permitting grand jury subpoenas regarding journalist
sources). See also Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 143-45 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding
that journalists and others have standing to challenge U.S. surveillance of international
communications), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) (mem.).
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The Supreme Court has treated these claims with varying degrees of sympathy. For example, it has rejected claims based on
defamation litigation costs107 but said in Citizens United that “[t]he
First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain
a campaign finance attorney.”108 Despite the Court’s varying treatment of some of these claims, as a logical matter they are all risks
imposed by legal uncertainty and capable of chilling protected
expression. Chilling effects have been invoked in a wide variety of
contexts to justify customized adjustments of particular legal rules
in light of their purported uncertainties.
Thus, the term “chilling effect” refers to a concern that an otherwise legitimate rule will curb protected expression outside its ambit.
This phenomenon generally arises when would-be speakers, faced
with the uncertainties of the legal process, refrain from making
protected statements. This is an evil of constitutional proportions
because free speech is an affirmative value, which the government
has a particular obligation to promote, or at least not to deter.
Chilling is combatted by legal rules that reduce the likelihood that
protected expression will be punished. Intent requirements are but
one example of such rules.
II. ROUGH JUDGMENT: THE SPECULATIVE CHILLING EFFECT
The difficulties with the chilling effect account of speaker’s intent
begin with the fact that the Supreme Court has not invoked the
chilling effect to explain some intent requirements, including those
for incitement and true threats.109 This difficulty, however, is surmountable: if intent requirements can only be justified on chilling
grounds, then all such requirements must be assessed in light of the
chilling effect. One must simply apply the Court’s reasoning in other
contexts to these doctrines.

107. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91; Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176.
108. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889.
109. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969) (per curiam). The Court has also not explicitly relied on the chilling effect in the
child pornography context, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982), but it has
analogized to obscenity, an area in which it has relied on chilling, see Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 148-49 (1959).
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This approach, however, encounters the further difficulty that,
when the Supreme Court has used the chilling effect to explain
intent requirements, it has relied on little more than crude empirical speculation about the effects of the challenged rule and the relief
that an intent requirement would provide.110 In signal areas such
as defamation and obscenity, the Court has provided no evidence
whatsoever to support either its diagnosis of chilling or its favored
cure.111 The Court has shown the same uncorroborated confidence
when curing chilling through rules other than intent112 and when
rejecting chilling effect claims altogether.113
Nor is the Court unaware of this problem. Dissents and majorities
routinely criticize each other for the flimsy empirical basis of their
assessments of chilling. In some cases in which majorities have
rejected or ignored potential chilling effects, dissenters have been
equally convinced of their existence.114 In other cases, when the
110. See Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 286 (noting that the Sullivan actual malice standard, “right or wrong,
was based on what was at best armchair economics and at worst casual speculation, not about
the law itself, but about the newspaper industry, its organization, and the incentives of its
inhabitants”); Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York Times “Actual Malice”
Standard Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153, 1189 (1993)
(noting that the Supreme Court in Sullivan did not rely on “detailed empirical studies” but
instead “chose, as it often does, to speculate about the need for an actual malice standard”).
111. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); Smith, 361 U.S. at 148-49.
The chilling effect of defamation law in the United States pre- and post-Sullivan, and under
current English law, is a matter of contention. See infra Part III.A and sources cited therein.
112. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-89 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435-36
(1963).
113. The Court often concludes that any chilling is insignificant compared with the
interests served, an approach that implies an ability to approximate the chilling involved. See,
e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 209 (2003); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 51-52 (1971); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman,
360 U.S. 72, 79-81 (1959). At other times, the Court says that the litigants have provided
insufficient evidence of chilling. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 60
(1989); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 167
(1971). The Court undermines this approach by accepting chilling elsewhere in the absence
of evidence. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 933 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting lack of evidence for majority’s finding of chilling); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (same).
114. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 561 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he result [of the majority’s approach] is a rule that may well chill
coverage—the kind of consequence that the law has considered important for decades.”); U.S.
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 596 (1973) (Douglas, J.,

2013]

SPEECH, INTENT, AND THE CHILLING EFFECT

1657

Court has recognized a chilling effect, the majority has found itself
attacked by some dissenters for acting without evidence115 and by
others for not taking chilling seriously enough.116
Thus, although the chilling effect has exerted a pervasive influence on First Amendment jurisprudence, this influence is founded
on little more than a collection of unsubstantiated empirical judgments. Of course, this state of affairs is not unique to the area of
chilling effects. Judicial decision making, including constitutional
decision making, often involves empirical determinations for which
judges have little guidance beyond their own rough sense of what is
true about the world.117 Professor Schauer has termed this “the
dilemma of ignorance”: some legal standards allow, or require, empirical judgments, but the questions involved are beyond the ken of
courts.118

dissenting) (“The chilling effect of these vague and generalized prohibitions is so obvious as
not to need elaboration.”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 740-41 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (finding that investigations “create uncertainty and needlessly discourage First
Amendment activity”).
115. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 933 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[T]he majority’s argument for striking down § 203 depends on its
contention that the statute has proved too ‘chilling’ in practice .... We have no record with
which to assess that claim.”); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 390 (White, J., dissenting) (“To me, it is quite
incredible to suggest that threats of libel suits from private citizens are causing the press to
refrain from publishing the truth. I know of no hard facts to support that proposition, and the
Court furnishes none.”). Of course, Justice White was correct that the Court supplied no
evidence for its conclusion; he in turn supplied none for his.
116. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 982 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority also should have held disclosure requirements
invalid on chilling effect grounds); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority’s rule did not offer adequate “breathing space” and that only an actual
malice standard was acceptable); see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293-94 (Black, J., concurring)
(rejecting actual malice in favor of an absolute press privilege); Smith, 361 U.S. at 156 (Black,
J., concurring) (“The fact is, of course, that prison sentences for possession of ‘obscene’ books
will seriously burden freedom of the press whether punishment is imposed with or without
knowledge of the obscenity.”).
117. See Schauer, supra note 110, at 286 (“[T]he phenomenon of lawmaking on the basis
of dimly informed policy speculation can arguably be said to be an accurate, even if possibly
mean-spirited, characterization of the entire common law process.”); id. at 287 (suggesting
that a Supreme Court decision on the nature of golf may seem untrustworthy, “but there is
no reason to believe it was any more amateurish than the Court’s knowledge of newspaper
practices in [Sullivan], its knowledge of educational psychology in Brown, or for that matter
its knowledge of the empirical dimensions of voting behavior in Bush v[.] Gore”).
118. See id. at 268-69.
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The very pervasiveness of the dilemma counsels a cautious response. To reject the chilling effect outright will lead to the rejection
of many other doctrines and outcomes. Unless we are to conclude
that all such law making is illegitimate, we need a more nuanced
response to adjudication on the basis of incomplete information.119
With this necessity in mind, this Part evaluates the chilling effect
on its own terms, as a product of rough empirical judgment. The
question is whether, on these terms, the chilling effect offers a satisfactory normative account of existing First Amendment intent
requirements. The working premise is that, if ignorance equally
besets all instances of chilling effect reasoning, then we should be
able to judge these instances in comparison with each other.
Justifications based on the chilling effect should all look roughly
reasonable. Aspects of the doctrine that reject the chilling effect
should seem plausibly distinguishable from those that rely on it.
Even by this standard, however, the chilling effect account of
speaker’s intent is unpersuasive. As a justification for existing law,
the chilling effect is both over- and underinclusive to an extent that
undermines its plausibility.
A. Overinclusiveness
In some areas, the premise that the chilling effect is the only
legitimate justification for intent requirements leads to an attempt
to justify standards that seem unnecessary to prevent chilling. In
these instances, the chilling effect rationale seems overinclusive.
1. Specific-Intent Requirements
The Supreme Court has imposed specific-intent requirements in
contexts such as incitement and threats.120 Interestingly, the Court
119. See id. at 292-94 (discussing possible responses to the problem of judicial empirical
ignorance).
120. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. The Communist-affiliation cases also
involved a specific-intent requirement, see supra note 50 and accompanying text, but they
provoke an objection different from the one outlined above. These cases are best understood
as instances in which the Court invoked the chilling effect in order to avoid the substantive
question of whether Communist affiliations were protected under the First Amendment. The
premise of the chilling effect argument was that it was arguably constitutional to penalize
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has not expressly justified these standards on chilling grounds, but
to the extent that our normative hypothesis is that the chilling
effect is the only legitimate justification for such standards, their
plausibility must be tested. As it turns out, it is difficult to argue
that the chilling effect justifies any First Amendment specific-intent
requirement, and certainly not these particular ones.
To see why, it is useful to consider the actual malice standard.
The perceived problem in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was that
strict liability for defamation chilled true speech because speakers
would hesitate to share true information unless they were sure it
was true.121 The actual malice standard remedies this effect by
distinguishing those speakers who have reason to know that their
speech is unprotected from those who do not. False and defamatory
speech is unprotected when speakers (1) know their speech is false
or (2) have subjective awareness of a substantial risk of falsity122—
that is, when speakers have subjective notice of falsity. Other false
and defamatory speech is protected.
With this demarcation, speakers can judge the status of their
speech ex ante. Speakers with subjective notice of falsity are not
likely to mistake themselves for unknowing speakers—they know
they are not. Nor, more importantly, are negligent or innocent
speakers likely to mistake themselves for unprotected speakers—
they lack the subjective notice to make them so. True, a court may
misjudge a speaker’s state of mind, and this risk may cause some
degree of chill. But on the whole, speakers have a much clearer
membership in subversive organizations, except for the fact that doing so might cause citizens
to hesitate to join other organizations. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519-20
(1958) (assuming without deciding that California could proscribe Communist affiliation
under criminal syndicalism act); Schauer, supra note 9, at 701-02 n.78 (suggesting that
Speiser may have been decided on chilling effect grounds to avoid the substantive validity of
the loyalty oath, which today would be considered unconstitutional). Only later did the Court
take the view that the First Amendment “prohibit[ed] a State from excluding a person from
a profession or punishing him solely because he is a member of a particular political
organization.” Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). Thus, the chilling effect account of this
area is inadequate not because the Court employed an implausible prophylactic standard but
because it should have employed a substantive rule rather than a prophylactic one.
121. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340-41.
122. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968). A better elaboration is
probably that the speaker must have subjective awareness of a risk of falsity substantial
enough that a reasonable person would have made further investigations or refrained from
publishing.
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sense of their liability because the line between protected and unprotected speech depends on something speakers may judge fairly
easily. Instead of being liable every time they do not have accurate
information about the world, they are liable only when they realize
their information may not be accurate; liability turns on their
knowledge not of the world but of themselves.
The question, then, is why the same standard is not sufficient for
unprotected speech such as incitement or threats. Recall that, on a
chilling effect rationale, all speech that causes the harm of inciting
or threatening is, in its own right, unprotected.123 An intent requirement forms a prophylactic shield around some of this speech
in order to safeguard other truly protected speech. To the extent
that some incitement or threats must be protected in order to shield
other expression, it is sufficient to draw the line at knowing and
reckless speakers—that is, to impose an actual malice standard. As
in the defamation context, these speakers have subjective awareness that their expression has a high probability of causing harm.
They are unlikely to mistake themselves for unknowing speakers,
and vice versa. Again, the danger exists that courts will misjudge a
speaker’s mental state, but this chill is mitigated by the fact that
(1) it should be difficult to prove that a speaker had subjective
awareness of the risks of her speech and (2) close cases should be
decided in favor of the speaker.
By contrast, the specific-intent standard is unnecessary. It is not
needed to give speakers notice of their status ex ante; in fact it
protects speakers who had notice that they were making unprotected statements. As a matter of rough empirical judgment, it is
difficult to see why actual malice should be a satisfactory standard
in the defamation context, but specific intent should be required for
incitement and threats.
One possible response is that incitement and threats require
higher intent standards because they involve criminal liability,
while defamation involves civil liability. I do not wish to understate
the significance of criminal conviction and punishment, or the likely
deterrent effect that their prospect might have. Nevertheless, as
an explanation for the difference in intent requirements, this
123. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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concern runs up against several difficulties. For one, in Garrison v.
Louisiana, the Supreme Court extended the actual malice standard
to criminal libel.124 This acceptance of actual malice in one criminal
context suggests that the Supreme Court does not regard specific
intent as necessary to prevent chilling whenever criminal law is
involved.
This view, moreover, is defensible in light of the distinction
between general criminal law requirements and First Amendment
requirements. The criminal law may favor specific-intent requirements in certain contexts, but this is not necessarily, let alone
exclusively, because such requirements prevent chilling of benign
conduct.125 It therefore does not follow that First Amendment intent
requirements, if imposed exclusively to address chilling, would
necessarily have to conform to criminal law preferences. This is all
the more true in light of the fact that First Amendment intent
requirements are imposed in addition to the due process safeguards
that criminal law already requires, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If chilling is all that matters, and if a knowledge or
recklessness standard is sufficient to give speakers advance notice
of the status of their expression, it is unclear why a higher intent
standard would be necessary as a matter of First Amendment
law.126
Another possible response is that some types of expression require more protection than others to achieve the same defense
against chilling. For example, some might argue that in the campaign setting, it is necessary to protect even deliberate lies, because
any prospect of state adjudication of truth would create an impermissible chill.127 One could construct similar arguments about the
need to protect knowing threats or incitement.
124. 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
125. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL CULPABILITY 113 (1990)
(arguing that intentional wrongful action is inherently more culpable than foreseen wrongful
action); A.P. Simester, Why Distinguish Intention from Foresight?, in HARM AND CULPABILITY
71, 71-72 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996) (arguing that foreseen and intended
wrongful actions are both culpable, but intended wrongful actions cannot be justified on
grounds of reasonableness).
126. See Alexander, Speaker’s Intent, supra note 2, at 25 (arguing that specific intent may
be required for purposes of criminal law, but some lower mental state may be sufficient to
address First Amendment interest in combatting chilling).
127. See, e.g., Varat, supra note 2, at 1119-22.
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But too many exceptions of this kind will return us to the difficulties surrounding nuanced empirical judgment. Only by demonstrating that a particular type of speech is distinctive may a court
justify a distinctive standard. In the absence of evidence to distinguish them, defamation, incitement, and threats present similar
issues. As a matter of unsubstantiated empirical judgment, the
chilling effect is not a satisfactory justification for specific-intent
requirements.128
2. Low-Value Expression: Obscenity and Child Pornography
The standards governing obscenity and child pornography seem
similarly overprotective. As noted earlier, in Smith v. California and
later cases, the Supreme Court required proof of the distributor’s
knowledge or recklessness regarding the factual contents of obscene
materials.129 The Court later extended the same standard to the
child pornography context.130 Thus, a standard very close to the actual malice standard governs distribution of obscenity and child
pornography, with the caveat that it is unclear whether their recklessness requirement is quite as demanding.131
Again, the comparison with defamation is instructive. Under the
logic of the chilling effect, the expression most likely to be chilled is
expression at the margins of protection.132 For the defamatory
speech governed by Sullivan, this marginal speech consists of
128. This is the conclusion that both Alexander and Schauer draw. Alexander argues that
the First Amendment cannot require the Brandenburg specific-intent standard. Alexander,
Speaker’s Intent, supra note 2, at 25. Schauer suggests that the threats test may be mistaken,
Schauer, supra note 2, at 222-23, and denies that the incitement test involves specific intent
at all, id. at 219. From their perspective, the implication of the mismatch is that specificintent requirements are not justified. From mine, the implication is that the chilling effect is
an inadequate justification for this aspect of existing law.
129. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
131. Compare St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (contending that actual
malice requires actual notice of a high risk of falsity), with Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 115
(1990) (maintaining that the state’s mens rea default rule of recklessness was sufficient), and
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643-44 (1968) (holding that a distributor of obscenity
must have “reason to know” of the contents of the materials to be held guilty).
132. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 9, at 696 (“[I]t is this ‘marginal’ conduct that is most
likely to be erroneously adjudged unlawful, and consequently the degree of fear will be
greatest where such borderline activities are involved.” (footnote omitted)).
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possibly false but ultimately true information about public figures
regarding a matter of public concern.133 It is clear why such speech
would contribute to the features that give protected expression
affirmative value.
It is less clear, however, why the Court would insist on the same
solicitude for borderline obscenity or child pornography.134 At first
glance, such expression seems to have few of the features that give
protected speech affirmative value. Under Farber’s view, for example, expression should be promoted because otherwise important
information is underproduced.135 Near-obscene material hardly
supplies the sort of information Farber has in mind. Even if it did,
Farber says that the market for pornography is so robust that it is
not a public good and thus does not require special protection from
chilling.136 Schauer’s view similarly invokes the importance of free
expression “for the uninhibited exchange of information, the active
search for truth and the open criticism of government.”137 The nearobscene, again, seems rather far afield from this mission.
On these terms, a stronger argument for protection existed when
there was a danger that a film adaptation of Lady Chatterley’s Lover
could be censored—that is, when Smith v. California was decided.138
But this is only to say that the chilling effect may have been an
acceptable justification at the time of Smith, not that it remains
one. As early as the mid-1960s, when the Court was writing approvingly of Smith in its defamation jurisprudence, obscenity was

133. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-57
(1985) (plurality opinion); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-81 (1964).
134. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529 (2009) (“[A]ny chilled
references to excretory and sexual material surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment
concern.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
70 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[F]ew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to
preserve the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our
choice.”).
135. See Farber, supra note 89, at 569-70.
136. See id. at 565.
137. Schauer, supra note 9, at 693.
138. See Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). Neither the Supreme
Court nor the New York Court of Appeals thought the film was obscene per se, but the latter
court opined that nonobscene material could be restricted for tending toward immoral ideas,
a contention that the Supreme Court rejected. Id. at 686-89.
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already a much narrower category.139 Since then, the Miller test140
has still defined the category quite narrowly.141 And to the extent
that some valuable expression still falls at the margins, it is likely
dwarfed by less valuable marginal expression.
The case for child pornography is worse. To apply chilling effect
reasoning to child pornography is to claim that sexually explicit
materials depicting people who appear to be minors not only should
be protected but should be affirmatively insulated from the incidental effects of regulation.142
This is not to say that there are no views under which these materials might merit special protection. One might take the view that
sexual speech is vitally important and that its restriction is likely
to rest on flawed views of sexuality generally, or female sexuality in
particular.143 Those valuing expression for autonomy-based reasons
might view it as facilitating self-expression or self-development.144
One might argue that, to the extent that sexual speech seeks to
influence social mores, it belongs to the political sphere.145 More
broadly, under many First Amendment theories, one could find it

139. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770 (1967) (per curiam) (holding that
written materials are constitutionally protected); A Book Named “John Clelend’s Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure” v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (plurality opinion) (defining
obscenity as “patently offensive” and “utterly without redeeming social value”).
140. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth the current test for
obscenity).
141. Cf. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 153-55 (1974) (holding that the film Carnal
Knowledge was protected expression under the Miller test).
142. One can always hypothesize, in the manner of overbreadth reasoning, a valuable
instance of expression that may or may not depict minors. But for the most part, the definition
of child pornography takes care of this problem: the materials must consist of “sexual acts or
lewd exhibitions of genitalia.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753 (1982). Any instances
of high-value expression captured by this definition are likely to be swamped by material that
illustrates the reasons for the existence of the category. One would have to contend that
promoting those few instances was reason enough to protect all the others. See id. at 762-63
(rejecting an overbreadth argument on the ground that instances of educationally or
artistically valuable child pornography are likely rare).
143. See, e.g., Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1140 (2005) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s nude dancing
jurisprudence as a reflection of cultural tropes portraying female sexuality as dangerous).
144. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 637
(1982).
145. See, e.g., T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40
U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 545 (1979).
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either imperative or expedient to resist value hierarchies and to
hold all protected expression deserving of equal treatment.146
These approaches, while possible as a matter of normative justification, are not available as long as our mission is to account for
the doctrine as it exists. The Supreme Court has quite clearly endorsed some degree of value hierarchy for speech.147 Most importantly for present purposes, it has said that political speech—of the
type protected in Sullivan—is at the “core” of First Amendment protection,148 and that sexual content—of the type chilled by obscenity
and child pornography laws—is at the periphery.149 Indeed, the
Court has recently rejected claims about the chilling of sexual content because of its allegedly minimal value.150 Under a hierarchical
approach, protections for marginal speech in the Sullivan context
should look quite different from protections for borderline obscenity
and child pornography.
The picture grows even more puzzling if one recalls that defamatory statements about private figures regarding matters of public
concern are protected by a negligence standard, not actual malice.151
Thus, borderline obscenity and child pornography actually receive
more protection against chilling than certain possibly false, but
ultimately true statements pertaining to matters of public concern.
146. See, e.g., Alexander, Low Value Speech, supra note 2, at 547-48 (criticizing the speechvalue hierarchy).
147. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (suggesting the existence of a
speech “hierarchy”).
148. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186-87 (1999)
(asserting that “core political speech” finds First Amendment protection “at its zenith”); Meyer
v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988) (identifying the circulation of a petition as “core political
speech”).
149. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(“[N]ude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the
outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.”); cf.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) (“[I]n our view, to equate the free and robust
exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material
demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic
struggle for freedom.”).
150. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529 (2009) (“[A]ny chilled
references to excretory and sexual material ‘surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment
concern.’” (quoting FCC v. Pacifia Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978))).
151. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). Gertz used the term “fault,”
typically understood as negligence, and in any case a “lesser” intent requirement than actual
malice.
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One might justify this result through a conception of free expression
that provides a great deal of privacy protection, but the Supreme
Court generally places a premium on the production of public information and tips the balance in favor of this imperative.152 The fact
that sexual speech receives more protection than production of some
public information makes it all the more difficult to rationalize the
existing intent requirements in terms of the chilling effect.
Thus, the chilling effect account of existing intent requirements
seems overinclusive in important respects. Some might argue that
protecting more speech than necessary is not a serious fault for a
First Amendment system. One need not take issue with this statement as a general matter to conclude that, as applied to the chilling
effect, it is an unavailing dodge. All laws have incidental effects on
expression.153 The goal of the chilling effect is to identify when these
incidental effects are out of range and to readjust them through
appropriate remedies. If there is no such thing as too much protection, then many more laws should come under scrutiny. As we shall
see in the next Section, there is already a good case that, under
existing standards, many more laws should do just that. But the
chilling effect cannot be a one-way ratchet without opening all laws
up to serious question. It must help to decide when special solicitude
against deterrent effects is appropriate.
B. Underinclusiveness
As suggested earlier, the Sullivan actual malice standard—unlike
the specific-intent requirements of incitement and threats—has
some intuitive plausibility as a remedy for chilling.154 Even here,
however, the chilling effect proves unsatisfactory. First, it is not
clear that an intent requirement for defamation reduces chilling.
Second, other aspects of defamation law seem equally reasonable
candidates for chilling analysis. Finally, acceptance of the chilling
152. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217-18 (2011) (foreclosing a private
figure’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress when caused by public picketing
on a matter of public concern); cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (applying
actual malice standard to an invasion-of-privacy claim for a fictionalized account of a crime
perpetrated against a private individual, who thereby became involuntarily newsworthy).
153. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 17.
154. See supra Part II.A.1.
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rationale here conflicts with the fundamental First Amendment
distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws.
1. The Underinclusiveness of an Intent Requirement
Though the chilling effect may plausibly capture a problem with
the common law of defamation, intent requirements may not be an
effective answer to this problem. In the defamation context, chilling
largely occurs through the mechanism of financial cost.155 Legal
liability costs defendants money, which they do not wish to pay.
Their desire to avoid the costs of liability prompts them to avoid
making statements the truth of which is uncertain. This, at least,
is the hypothesis of the chilling effect.
But intent requirements may do very little to change the costs of
libel for potential defendants.156 First, the actual malice standard
does not assure correct outcomes, as Sullivan itself illustrates. The
Court in Sullivan was so concerned that an Alabama jury would
misapply the actual malice standard on remand that, in extremely
pointed dictum, it reviewed the evidence itself and concluded that
it would not meet the newly established standard.157 Given that the
Supreme Court cannot review every case, Sullivan left a risk of
error for subsequent cases.
Even if Sullivan materially reduces the likelihood of adverse
judgments, these are not the only costs of litigation. Defense costs
can far outweigh the costs of a judgment, and even when the
likelihood of an adverse outcome is low, litigation costs can remain
155. In the criminal libel context, of course, other costs figure in. Even in the civil context,
other costs exist, such as damage to journalistic reputation. But for large-scale media
defendants, most of the costs of libel will consist of or be translated into financial costs.
156. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487,
488 (1991) (arguing that additional constitutional safeguards were necessary in subsequent
cases because “[t]he actual malice rule of New York Times v. Sullivan does not adequately
protect the press” (footnote omitted)).
157. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-88 (1964). Justice Brennan’s papers
reveal that Justice Harlan proposed reversal rather than remand, but Brennan pointed out
that there was no precedent for such a maneuver. See LEWIS, supra note 27, at 174. They
eventually settled on Brennan’s original solution, which is reflected in Part III of the opinion.
See id. at 173-76. Twenty years after Sullivan, the problem of erroneous jury findings on the
actual malice question eventually gave rise to a rule of independent appellate review of the
record in defamation cases. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
511 (1984).
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high.158 Intent requirements do little to address these costs because
they “operate[ ] at the wrong end of the litigation.”159 They may
increase the defendant’s prospect of victory, but this alteration may
do very little to affect the likelihood of suit or the costs of a
defense.160 True, the prospect of having to establish knowledge or
recklessness may deter some would-be plaintiffs, but it may be hard
for plaintiffs to estimate their likelihood of showing actual malice in
advance of discovery.161 In addition, some may sue, not strictly for
the prospect of victory, but because suing is its own form of vindication.162 These suits will occur despite the legal standard, and they
will still be quite costly to defend. This line of argument receives
support from the number of jurisdictions that have supplemented
the constitutional rules with other protections, most notably antiSLAPP provisions against strategic lawsuits.163 On one view, then,
intent requirements are not sufficient to address the problem of
chilling.
On an even darker view, intent requirements may actually exacerbate the problem.164 Post-Sullivan, the defendant’s state of mind
is a central legal question in any defamation case. This is a question
of fact, which justifies exhaustive discovery into what information

158. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 87, at 436.
159. Id. at 437.
160. Id. at 424 (“The Times privilege has failed to prevent self-censorship primarily because
it does little to reduce the cost of defending against libel claims.”).
161. Anderson, supra note 156, at 536 (“In cases in which actual malice is an issue,
plaintiffs often have no way of knowing whether they have any chance of succeeding until
discovery is completed. They must therefore put themselves and defendants to considerable
expense and inconvenience before they have the information needed to make rational
litigation decisions.”).
162. Anderson, supra note 87, at 435.
163. See, e.g., Responding to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs),
DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/responding-strategic-lawsuitsagainst-public-participation-slapps (last updated Feb. 4, 2013) (identifying twenty-eight states
that have anti-SLAPP statutes, and others that have similar common law protections).
164. See, e.g., Benjamin Barron, A Proposal to Rescue New York Times v. Sullivan by
Promoting a Responsible Press, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 73, 84-85 (2007); Richard A. Epstein, Was
New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, in THE COST OF LIBEL 121, 143 (Everette E. Dennis &
Eli M. Noam eds., 1989) (“[T]here is simply more to litigate once actual malice is critical to
liability.”); Weaver & Bennett, supra note 110, at 1154-55 (noting that growing litigation costs
are “due, in part, to the fact that the actual malice standard encourages plaintiffs to seek
extensive discovery”).
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the defendant had and what she did with it.165 In addition, as the
Supreme Court has recognized, courts may be unwilling to answer
this question as a matter of law, such that a trial is necessary.166
Thus, Sullivan interposed an extremely fact-intensive, discoveryintensive—which is to say, very costly—standard into defamation
litigation. Although this standard may reduce the likelihood of an
adverse judgment, it may increase litigation costs, as the Supreme
Court has admitted.167 Because financial cost is the primary mechanism through which libel laws exert a chill on media defendants,
such a rule could actually chill more expression than the regime it
was designed to remedy.
2. The Case of Litigation Costs
In the 1970s and 1980s, these concerns led some scholars to worry
that the actual malice standard had not lessened chilling but may
have worsened it.168 They identified increased litigation costs as a
primary culprit. One response was to argue that litigation costs also
should be of constitutional concern.169 On precisely this basis, some
165. See Anderson, supra note 156, at 511 (arguing that state of mind is “a complex factual
issue that normally cannot be resolved without discovery, sometimes in prodigious
quantities”); Weaver & Bennett, supra note 110, at 1155 (“[D]iscovery ... is the only way to
determine whether a defendant acted knowingly or recklessly.”).
166. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (“The proof of ‘actual malice’
calls a defendant’s state of mind into question, ... and does not readily lend itself to summary
disposition.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Anderson, supra note 156, at 510 (“The
actual malice requirement introduces into every public-plaintiff case a difficult issue that does
not lend itself to preliminary disposition. Indeed, the issue does not readily lend itself to
disposition at all. Cases that turn on actual malice sometimes continue for ten or fifteen
years.” (footnotes omitted)).
167. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (observing that as compared with the
common law regime, “[t]he plaintiff's burden is now considerably expanded. In every or almost
every case, the plaintiff must focus on the editorial process and prove a false publication
attended by some degree of culpability on the part of the publisher. If plaintiffs in consequence
now resort to more discovery, it would not be surprising; and it would follow that the costs and
other burdens of this kind of litigation would escalate and become much more troublesome
for both plaintiffs and defendants”); see also id. at 176 n.25 (“It is noted that Lando’s
deposition alone continued intermittently for over a year and filled 26 volumes containing
nearly 3,000 pages and 240 exhibits.”).
168. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 87, at 424; Epstein, supra note 164, at 138-45. See
generally the essays collected in THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 164.
169. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 87, at 468 (arguing that summary judgment should be
more readily available in the defamation context).
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lower courts in the wake of Sullivan approved defamation-specific
modifications to procedural rules that were perceived as costly.170
The Supreme Court, however, roundly rejected such modifications
to jurisdictional rules,171 summary judgment rules,172 and discovery
procedures.173
On the logic of the chilling effect, however, the proposed modifications were quite plausible. Rules deter expression when they
threaten to impose financial cost. In Sullivan, the substantive legal
standard threatened to cost money through adverse judgments.174
Therefore the legal standard had to be changed. But like adverse
judgments, litigation expenses also cost potential defendants money.
Thus, legal rules that contribute to litigation costs should also be
modified.
One response is that the constitutional standards in Sullivan and
Gertz had already figured in the costs of procedural rules. This is
the argument the Supreme Court made in Calder v. Jones.175 In
declining to modify jurisdictional rules in the defamation context,
the Court said that it had already made a comprehensive chilling
assessment in the earlier cases, and “[t]o reintroduce those concerns
at the jurisdictional stage would be a form of double counting.”176
On the evidence, however, this seems far-fetched. First, the Court
made no mention of the costs of jurisdictional rules in announcing
its standards in Sullivan or Gertz. Second, the Court’s claim that it
did account for them simply grants the premise that these costs

170. See Schauer, supra note 9, at 710 (collecting cases).
171. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (rejecting chilling effect argument in
applying a regular jurisdictional standard).
172. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986) (applying regular summary
judgment rules); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (suggesting that no
special rules apply to summary judgment in defamation suits); see also Anderson, supra note
156, at 498 (“The Court has never endorsed the view of some lower courts that summary
judgment should be a preferred remedy in defamation cases to protect the press from the
chilling effect of extended litigation.”).
173. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (explaining that discovery costs do not
trigger worries about a chilling effect).
174. See supra Part II.B.1.
175. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790; see also Schauer, supra note 9, at 711 (noting that lower court
cases approving litigation-costs arguments “seem to have underestimated the extent to which
New York Times and its progeny have already accounted for that effect”).
176. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
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should figure into the chilling effect calculation.177 Once that premise is granted, it becomes implausible that the Court should not
have to revisit this calculation. To think otherwise demands that
both the pertinent rules and the costs of compliance remain fairly
constant. The first of these is a reasonable assumption—and, in
any case, easy to verify—but the second is not at all assured.
Compliance costs could have changed drastically in the twenty years
between Sullivan and Calder. On the Court’s own logic, then, it had
a responsibility to ask whether changed circumstances warranted
reconsideration of its rule.
The double-counting argument fares even worse when one considers litigation costs arising from discovery. In rejecting a chilling
effect claim as to discovery costs in Herbert v. Lando, the Court,
perhaps wisely, did not say that it had already budgeted for these
costs.178 If it had, it could hardly have escaped doing the calculation
again, as it described pretrial discovery costs as “mushrooming” and
cited numerous opinions and other works by Supreme Court
Justices—all from the five years between Gertz and Herbert—
bemoaning a growing litigation-costs crisis.179 If, as the doublecounting argument grants, the costs of procedural rules may cause
a chilling effect, a litigation-costs explosion would necessarily
prompt a recalculation. Because the costs of rules change, claims
that they need modification cannot be dismissed out of hand as
double counting.
Rather, the Court’s stance in Herbert was, fairly clearly, that it
had not budgeted for “mushrooming” litigation costs, but because
such costs were “not peculiar to the libel and slander area,” the
solution had to await a general change in the Federal Rules.180 Until
then, defendants were to rely on the discretion of district court
judges to contain discovery.181 This rationale has some appeal—
perhaps it is preferable to effect defamation-specific change through
defamation-specific rules, rather than through exceptions to general

177. See Schauer, supra note 9, at 711 (arguing that lower court cases accepting litigationcosts arguments “are clearly correct in their prediction of a chilling effect”).
178. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176-77.
179. Id. at 176-77 & n.26.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 177.
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rules182—and yet it can only go so far. An underlying premise of the
First Amendment is that it requires exceptions to general rules.
These are usually substantive rules, but it is not clear why they
could not be procedural.183 The chilling rationale should recognize
a constitutional problem in any legal rule that has a substantial
deterrent effect on protected expression. If the Court was serious
about the chilling effect in Sullivan, its response in Herbert left a
grave constitutional harm unanswered.
Thus, even in the defamation context, where the chilling effect
may plausibly explain the existence of intent requirements, it does
so awkwardly. The Court has adopted intent requirements that may
have a minimal, even adverse, impact on chilling while leaving untouched legal features that have clear deterrent potential. The
chilling effect cannot explain why the Court would single out the
question of the speaker’s state of mind while ignoring these other
aspects of the law.
3. The Chilling Effect and Content-Neutral Laws
The broader picture of First Amendment law also suggests that
chilling is, at best, an intermittent concern. The primary example
is the approach to content-neutral laws. A central tenet of modern
First Amendment law is that laws restricting expression on the
basis of its message are highly suspect.184 The corollary is that laws
that do not regulate on this basis are less suspect. In fact, such
“content-neutral” laws receive extremely lenient treatment, under
which they are routinely upheld against the most cursory scrutiny.185
Given that the doctrine upholds content-neutral laws with little
to no concern about their effects, any number of neutral legal rules
may work to suppress expression, with no constitutional ramifica182. See Schauer, supra note 9, at 711.
183. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984)
(mandating independent appellate review of the record in defamation cases).
184. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
185. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of
Incidental Restrictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 788 (1985) (“In
practice, the application of the lower track of this analysis, although open linguistically to the
possibility of some bite, has resembled rational basis review.”).
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tions.186 Regulations of activities such as leafleting, handbilling,
parading, protesting, and demonstrating reduce the visibility and
immediacy of certain messages and may prevent some members of
society from reaching a wide audience altogether.187 Noise ordinances affect the number of people a particular message may reach.
Conduct regulations affect the efficiency and impact of many
messages—consider sit-ins and draft-card burning.188 The detrimental incidental effects of these laws are obvious—at least, they are as
obvious as the detrimental effect of common law libel rules.189
One potential objection is that in calling this problem a chilling
effect, I am misusing that term. Chilling denotes the deterrence of
protected expression in the course of targeting unprotected expression.190 Content-neutral laws do not present this problem because
they directly regulate expression that the law can regulate. The
state can regulate expression such as leafleting, or conduct that may
be expressive, so long as it does so for the right reasons. A consequent reduction in these activities does not constitute a chill.
One response is that this is just a problem of how the language of
chilling maps onto the government-purpose-based conception of the
First Amendment embodied in the content-neutral principle. The
more apt formulation is that chilling occurs when, in the course of
pursuing legitimate purposes, a law incidentally deters protected
expression. Thus, a chilling effect arises when, in the course of targeting unprotected false and defamatory speech—a constitutionally
valid purpose—a law incidentally deters protected true speech. A
186. See, e.g., Kendrick, supra note 1, at 289-90 (arguing that the content-neutral doctrine
shows minimal interest in the effects of regulation); Redish, supra note 1, at 113-14
(criticizing the content-neutral doctrine for its insensitivity to incidental effects on
expression); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 615, 617 (1991) (same); see also Kagan, supra note 1, at 446 (emphasizing that
content-neutral laws may distort speech as much as content-based laws); David A. Strauss,
The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 199 (1988) (same).
187. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 186, at 637 (discussing the potentially devastating
impact of format-related regulations).
188. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (upholding the prohibition
on draft-card burning as justified by administrative interests); Williams, supra note 186, at
661-62 (analyzing the impact of content-neutral regulations on symbolic speech).
189. See Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 936,
946-47 (1987) (criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to consider the chilling effect of
content-neutral laws).
190. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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chilling effect also arises when, in the course of targeting litter—a
constitutionally valid purpose—a law incidentally deters protected
expression. If the incidental effect is impermissible in the former
context, it should be so in the latter.
Another response is that, however the chilling effect is described,
its underlying concern is with the incidental effects of regulation on
protected expression. If free speech is an affirmative value, then we
should care when protected expression is hindered, whether by
content-based or content-neutral laws.
Rather than objecting, a defender of the chilling rationale could
accept the underinclusiveness argument and conclude that the
content-discrimination principle should be modified. This, however,
would mean abandoning a central principle of modern First
Amendment law and conceding that the chilling effect cannot justify
the law as it currently exists.191
Even as a matter of rough empirical judgment, the chilling effect
account of speaker’s intent fails to persuade. It does not explain
specific-intent requirements for incitement and threats. It does not
explain why the law would single out sexually explicit speech for
protection when such speech may be particularly resistant to chill
and not particularly deserving of special solicitude. It does not explain why the law would tinker with intent requirements in the
defamation context when such modifications do not change, and
may exacerbate, costly features of the law. It does not explain why
the Court ignores costly features, such as the expense of litigation.
And it does not explain why a network of intent requirements in
certain speech categories would exist alongside a general indifference to the incidental effects of all content-neutral regulation. In
short, the chilling effect is not a persuasive justification for existing
standards of speaker’s intent.
191. Others have raised underinclusiveness objections to other aspects of chilling effect
doctrine. For example, the Court made commercial speech a separate category in part because
of its judgment that such speech is less likely to be chilled than other speech. Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). Many
commentators have argued that this assumption is unfounded, if not precisely backwards.
See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1992); Redish, supra
note 144, at 633; Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from
a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1983).
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III. A QUESTION OF POLICY: THE EMPIRICAL CHILLING EFFECT
Perhaps treating the chilling effect as the Supreme Court treats
it—as a matter of speculative empirical judgment—is the wrong
approach. Conceivably, courts are better than regular individuals at
judging the effects of legal rules. If so, then more sophisticated
empirical analysis might reveal that the Court’s judgments are on
the whole quite sound. Perhaps, then, a better response is to expose
the Court’s judgments to more thorough empirical inquiry.
Ultimately, however, this approach seems similarly unavailing.
Of all the First Amendment intent requirements, only the Sullivan
actual malice standard has undergone significant empirical investigation.192 This investigation gives some reason to believe that the
standard is misguided. More importantly, it illustrates the difficulties of using empirical analysis to corroborate a choice as nuanced
as that between one intent requirement and another. This Part
examines the empirical literature on actual malice before focusing
on possible limits to courts’ abilities to improve chilling effect
analysis by investing in more empirical approaches.
A. Empirical Accounts of the Chilling Effect
It is difficult to establish either the presence or the absence of a
chilling effect, let alone to measure the extent of such an effect.193
The available empirical studies illustrate the difficulties. The studies of speaker’s intent have dealt almost entirely with defamation,
and primarily with the actual malice standard. For the most part,
they are unable to demonstrate a connection between a chosen legal
standard and a reduction of chilling at the level of nuance required
to justify the selection of one intent requirement over another.

192. See infra Part III.A.4.
193. See Schauer, supra note 9, at 730 (arguing that the chilling effect’s predictions about
human behavior are “most likely unprovable”).
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1. Litigation Data
Some commentators rely on litigation data to assess chilling.194
This is not a particularly reliable approach: the number of cases
filed may bear little relation to the amount of speech that is actually
chilled—that is, to the cases that are not filed because the speech is
never spoken.195 A low amount of litigation could signal a very clear
but repressive speech rule, rather than a permissive one.196
In reality, of course, the American defamation regime is the most
protective in the world. Some commentators have concluded, partly
on the basis of litigation data, that American defamation rules do
194. See, e.g., ERIC BARENDT ET AL., LIBEL AND THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT 31-32
(1997) (analyzing the chilling effect of English libel rules by tracking legal filings and
conducting interviews); David A. Logan, Essay, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on
Current Data on Libel Litigation, 87 VA. L. REV. 503, 511 (2001) (relying on data on litigation
rates, as well as anecdotal evidence, to conclude that chilling is not a serious problem for
American media).
Recent litigation data on actions involving media defendants are available from the Media
Law Resource Center (MLRC). According to MLRC, from 1980 to 2006 media defendants faced
557 trials nationwide involving defamation, privacy, and related claims. 2008 Report on Trials
and Damages, 2008 MEDIA L. RESOURCE CENTER BULL. No. 1, Feb. 2008, at 3. Media
defendants won 41.1 percent of trial verdicts. Id. When broken down by decade, this number
shows improving rates of success by defendants, with defense verdicts in 54.5 percent of cases
in the 2000s. Id. at 4. From 1980 to 2006, after all appeals, defendants paid no damages in
55.9 percent of cases. Id. The average award at trial was $2.8 million; the average award after
postverdict motions and appeals was $556,000. Id. The median after trial was $295,000; after
appeals it was $100,000. Id. In 2007, six trials took place nationwide. Id.
Out of 1616 reported summary judgment decisions from 1980 to 2006, defendants won 78.3
percent outright. 2007 Summary Judgment Study, 2007 MEDIA L. RESOURCE CENTER BULL.
No. 2 Part B, Sept. 2007, at 15. MLRC notes, however, that it does not count unreported
decisions, and that reported summary judgment decisions may skew in favor of defendants.
Id. at 1.
195. See, e.g., BARENDT ET AL., supra note 194, at 32 (noting that incidence of legal filings
is not representative, and that the biggest impact of the chilling effect is in what does not get
published). Another problem is that litigation data becomes more comprehensive as cases
move toward trial, but—to the questionable extent that litigation data reveals anything about
chilling—it is the pretrial stage that matters most to the cost and efficacy of defamation rules.
F. Dennis Hale, Impact Analysis of the Law Concerning Freedom of Expression, 8 COMM. & L.
35, 49 (1986).
196. In a similar vein, low litigation rates could say little about the legal regime and much
about potential defendants’ skill at navigating that regime. As repeat players advised by
sophisticated and risk-averse legal counsel, the institutional media could be quite adept at
strategic self-censorship. See BARENDT ET AL., supra note 194, at 32 (noting that because the
press is skilled at predicting the risk of suit, English libel rules may deter expression about
powerful or wealthy individuals more than expression about others).
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not chill the media to any serious degree.197 But if litigation rates do
reflect an absence of chilling, they cannot show how, if at all, the
constitutional intent standards contribute to that reality. First, it is
impossible to say whether the constitutional standards reduced
chilling without knowing what levels of chilling predated them.
Second, the Supreme Court has refined and clarified defamation
standards over the course of more than twenty-five cases in which
it constitutionalized many other rules, including a heightened burden of proof, a shift of that burden to the plaintiff, independent
appellate review of the record, and various requirements that the
false statement be credible and have caused damage beyond what
a true statement would have caused.198 Nonconstitutional obstacles
such as state anti-SLAPP laws and the federal Communications
Decency Act also protect speakers and distributors from liability.199
It is not clear how much this combination of factors has reduced
chilling, and it is impossible to isolate the role of intent requirements.
2. Quantitative Empirical Comparisons
Quantitative empirical studies face these and other problems,
with the result that studies of the chilling effect are rare.200 It is
197. See Logan, supra note 194, at 520 (“One could say that the New York Times/Gertz
constitutional regime has provided the media with something approaching an absolute
privilege to defame; a reasonable publisher should worry about having to pay substantial libel
damages as much as she worries about being struck by lightning.”); see also David A.
Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047, 1049-50 (2006) (“As a source of
litigation, there is little left of the law of defamation.”). For recent litigation data, see supra
note 194.
198. See Anderson, supra note 156, at 488 & n.2 (arguing that “[t]he actual malice rule of
New York Times v. Sullivan does not adequately protect the press,” and noting that the
Supreme Court elaborated on libel standards in twenty-seven cases between 1964 and 1991);
Anderson, supra note 197, at 1050-51 (cataloguing rules and characterizing them as “[m]ore
important” than the actual malice standard).
199. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”); Anderson, supra note 197, at 1051; Responding to Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), supra note 163 (noting that twenty-eight
states have anti-SLAPP statutes, while others have similar common law protections).
200. See, e.g., Chris Dent & Andrew T. Kenyon, Defamation Law’s Chilling Effect: A
Comparative Content Analysis of Australian and U.S. Newspapers, 9 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV.
89, 90 (2004) (“Very little work has examined media product in order to consider the existence
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difficult, if not impossible, to find two defamation regimes to compare whose only difference is their intent requirement.201 Even the
shift from the common law to Sullivan in 1964 would not isolate this
variable, because Sullivan also began the work of shifting the
burden of proof to the plaintiff and imposing a clear and convincing
evidence standard.202
Even if a comparison were able to isolate the role of speaker’s
intent, the problem would remain of how to measure expression.
The chilling effect encompasses not only outright suppression of
speech but also subtle modification.203 Media defendants might be
more likely to respond to a repressive defamation regime not by
ignoring newsworthy events, but by modifying their coverage.204
Counting up speech quantities will therefore provide only a crude
proxy for chilling.205 Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that
of any chilling effect.”); Piero Stanig, Regulation of Speech and Media Coverage of Corruption:
An Empirical Analysis of the Mexican Press 6 (London Sch. of Econ., Working Paper, 2010),
available at http://www.hertie-school.org/fileadmin/images/Downloads/research_projects/
StanigMexPress.pdf (“[W]hile the chilling effect is taken for granted, only very few studies try
to systematically show its existence and rigorously quantify the magnitude of the effect of
legal regulation on coverage.”).
201. This factor complicates comparisons across countries, as does the general problem of
omitted variable bias. And of course the uniform constitutional standard in the United States
eliminates domestic opportunities for natural experiments. See Stanig, supra note 200
(analyzing press coverage of corruption across Mexican states with different criminal libel
regimes).
202. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (holding that plaintiff must
prove actual malice with “convincing clarity”). Later cases confirmed and clarified this shift.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986) (holding that
heightened standard applies at summary judgment stage); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 74 (1964) (holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof).
203. See, e.g., Weaver & Bennett, supra note 110, at 1173 (counting modifications to stories
as instances of chilling).
204. See BARENDT ET AL., supra note 194, at 194 (speculating that one effect of English libel
law may be to encourage a more opinion-based, less fact-intensive brand of journalism).
205. An instructive comparison may be drawn with the chilling effect of the fairness
doctrine. To the extent that we care only about the quantity of references to public issues in
broadcast media, data from before and after the repeal of the fairness doctrine can give us a
good sense of its chilling effect. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the
Fairness Doctrine a “Chilling Effect”? Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1997) (finding a chilling effect by comparing radio industry data on
subject matter before and after the repeal of the fairness doctrine); Christopher Weare, Titus
Levi & Jordan Raphael, Media Convergence and the Chilling Effect of Broadcast Licensing,
6 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 47 (2001) (analyzing 469 newspaper editorials on State of the
Union addresses from 1970 to 1995 to test for chilling as to owners that also owned broadcast
outlets). To the extent that we care about the quality of coverage of public issues, however,
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there have been few empirical studies of the actual malice standard,
let alone other First Amendment intent requirements.
3. Interviews and Surveys
The most frequent research methods are interviews or surveys.206
Some of these employ tested surveys and econometric tools;207 most
employ a more casual approach.208 In their conclusions on chilling,
such studies have varied.209 As reliable assessment tools, they have
drawbacks. For instance, they pose risks of self-reporting bias.210
Survey subjects may not recall or report all relevant information.
Even if they do, their presentation may be biased toward their selfinterest.211 For instance, media participants may be unwilling to
admit that they sacrificed journalistic principles out of fear of litigation, or they may be willing to exaggerate the chilling effect of the
law in order to downplay other considerations that informed a
decision to kill or revise a story.212
these studies are less helpful.
206. See Hale, supra note 195, at 49 (surveying types of data available and stating that
surveys are “[t]he most frequently used research method for measuring the impact of media
law”); see also BARENDT ET AL., supra note 194, at 35-36 (employing various interview
methods); Michael Massing, The Libel Chill: How Cold Is It Out There?, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., May-June 1985, at 31 (relying upon around 150 interviews with editors and attorneys);
Stephen M. Renas et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Chilling Effect, in THE COST OF LIBEL,
supra note 164, at 41, 45 (relying upon survey sent to managing editors of U.S. daily
newspapers).
207. See Renas et al., supra note 206, at 41, 45 (sending newspaper managing editors a
tested survey about their hypothetical decisions on four stories under three legal rules).
208. See, e.g., Massing, supra note 206, at 31 (relying on interviews with editors and
attorneys); Weaver & Bennett, supra note 110, at 1157 (relying on interviews with American
and British lawyers, editors, reporters, and other media players). For a hybrid approach, see
BARENDT ET AL., supra note 194, at 35 (sending questionnaires, conducting “one-off”
interviews, and conducting a series of interviews with defamation attorneys, as well as relying
on litigation data).
209. Compare Weaver & Bennett, supra note 110, at 1182-83 (observing that virtually all
interview subjects claimed libel law had no influence on editorial decisions), with David A.
Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 860
(1986) (noting that many media participants claimed to experience a chilling effect).
210. See Hale, supra note 195, at 38, 41 (asserting that survey responses by media
participants and attorneys are biased).
211. Id. at 41.
212. Experiments are another potential source of data, which seem to be utilized
infrequently. But see Jeremy Cohen et al., Perceived Impact of Defamation: An Experiment on
Third-Person Effects, 52 PUB. OPINION Q. 161, 161 (1988) (finding that tested students
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4. Economic Models
One method that has addressed the intent question directly is
theoretical economic modeling. The economic tradition of questioning the actual malice standard goes back many decades. Richard
Epstein argued in the 1980s that Sullivan was wrongly decided;213
his work was part of a wider debate about whether the informational and litigation costs of actual malice meant that the standard
was inefficient, perhaps even inferior to the common law.214
Since that time, some economists have used theoretical models to
consider the relative efficiency of possible libel regimes. Some have
argued that strict liability may be preferable to both negligence and
actual malice, largely because of the information costs associated
with the latter standards.215 Some argue that strict liability is too
exacting, actual malice is too permissive, and the first-best standard
may lie in between.216 In making this argument, moreover, some
studies have said that the difference between a negligence standard
and an actual malice standard is insignificant, thus suggesting that
the choice between the two cannot be justified in economic terms.217
Finally, many studies agree that limiting damages is likely superior
to adjusting intent requirements and is in any case a necessary step
for efficient outcomes.218
believed others would be more affected by defamatory statements than they themselves
would); Renas et al., supra note 206, at 45 (asking newspaper managing editors about their
hypothetical decisions on four stories under three legal rules).
213. Epstein, supra note 164, at 151.
214. See generally the essays collected in THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 164.
215. See Manoj Dalvi & James F. Refalo, An Economic Analysis of Libel Law, 34 E. ECON.
J. 74 (2008); Epstein, supra note 164, at 148; Gary L. Lee, Comment, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence: An Economic Analysis of the Law of Libel, 1981 BYU L. REV. 398, 404-05 (arguing
that if information costs are low, negligence is likely superior to strict liability). On the
information costs associated with actual malice, see supra Part II.B.
216. See, e.g., Charles J. Hartmann et al., Relaxed Liability: A Proposed New Standard for
Defamation by the Press, 22 AM. BUS. L.J. 93, 106 (1984) (arguing that the optimal standard
of “relaxed” liability lies in between strict liability and negligence); Stephen M. Renas et al.,
Toward an Economic Theory of Defamation, Liability, and the Press, 50 S. ECON. J. 451, 451
(1983) (same); Alain Sheer & Asghar Zardkoohi, Is the Law of Defamation as It Relates to
Public Officials and Public Figures Economically Efficient?, in THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note
164, at 207, 223-24 (“[T]he new law of defamation probably substitutes an imbalance in favor
of publication for an imbalance in favor of reputation.”).
217. See Hartmann et al., supra note 216, at 106; Renas et al., supra note 216, at 459.
218. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Assaf Hamdani, Contribution Article, Optimal Liability for
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My purpose is not to offer an exhaustive analysis of this literature, still less to criticize the methods of particular studies. It is,
instead, to observe that these various empirical investigations fail
to confirm the wisdom of the actual malice standard. If anything,
some of them, particularly the theoretical economic studies, suggest
that the actual malice standard may not be the best tool for addressing chilling. And insofar as the studies suggest the difficulty
of isolating the role of intent, they offer little reason to conclude that
intent is the most effective tool to alleviate chilling—let alone that
one intent requirement is more effective than all other intent requirements and all other legal tools.
B. The Chilling Effect and the Limits of Empirical Inquiry
But the fact that existing empirical inquiries have not made much
headway does not mean that further inquiry could not shed more
light. On one view, the empirical difficulties of law making should
lead courts and scholars to invest further in answering the hard
questions courts face.219
Given the pervasive empirical bent in judicial decision making,
this is a worthy goal. As applied to the chilling effect account of
speaker’s intent, however, it is not entirely promising. The empirical
studies just surveyed underscore the difficulty of the questions that
the Court has set for itself. As it turns out, the existence of a chilling
effect—let alone its appropriate remedy—is very difficult to establish, even with the aid of a variety of sophisticated empirical tools.
Although courts routinely address complex empirical questions,
for a court to identify and remedy a chilling effect involves multiple
and varied empirical questions, most of which are counterfactual.
Libel, 2 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, no. 1, 2003; Dalvi & Refalo, supra note 215, at 87;
Epstein, supra note 164, at 148; Nuno Garoupa, The Economics of Political Dishonesty and
Defamation, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 167, 178 (1999); Hartmann et al., supra note 216, at
106; Renas et al., supra note 216, at 459.
219. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 2, at 292-94. On the judicial side, Justice Breyer’s
approach is emblematic. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2768-70
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (relying on empirical studies, attached in appendices, to argue
for upholding state restriction on sale of violent video games to minors); Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 807-23 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(relying upon numerous sources, catalogued in an appendix, in bringing historical facts to
bear on the constitutionality of public schools’ student assignment plans).
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The success of a court’s response to these questions is difficult
enough to judge ex post and essentially impossible to judge ex ante.
First, the identification of a chilling effect implies a judgment that
a given legal rule will overdeter protected speech as compared with
its deterrence of unprotected speech and furtherance of other legitimate governmental interests. In essence, the court performs a type
of cost-benefit analysis reminiscent of the Hand formula, in which
it compares the benefits of a rule against the probability that
protected speech will be chilled, with the protected speech being
given appropriate weight as an affirmative and preferred value.220
Second, to arrive at a remedy, the court must consider the costbenefit profiles of possible alternative rules and select the one that
provides the optimal balance of reducing chilling and still furthering
legitimate goals. Multiple assessments go into both of these endeavors.
To assess the benefits of the challenged rule, the court needs to
know how much unprotected speech it deters and the extent to
which it advances other legitimate interests. To know this, the court
must either make assumptions about the law’s deterrent effect—a
potentially risky approach221—or attempt to measure the effectiveness of the rule in actually deterring unprotected speech—a complex
inquiry that depends on some knowledge of the risk profile of the
affected speakers.
On the other side of the equation, the court must assess the value
of the protected speech that may be put at risk. It is not enough to
say that some speech of some kind is probably deterred. Because all
laws have incidental effects on expression, this standard would
render many rules unconstitutional. The court must have a sense of
how much speech is at risk, and of what kind. The court thus faces
the difficult, if not impossible, task of knowing the quantity and
220. Ultimately, the court is comparing the marginal risk of chill—that is, the difference
between the chill of this rule and the next most effective rule—to the cost of trading the rule
out for the next most effective rule. This formulation simply conflates the steps that I break
apart here: assessing the cost-benefit profile of the existing rule, and then comparing it with
that of other rules. Whichever approach one takes involves the same steps and the same
assessments.
221. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 95152 (2003) (arguing that criminal law assumptions about deterrence are mistaken).
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value of expression that does not exist because it is not being produced.222
At the same time, the court must assess the probability that this
speech will actually be chilled. This requires knowledge of the costs
and benefits to speakers of producing that speech. It is not sufficient
to consider the cost side of the equation. For one thing, all laws
impose incidental costs on expression, and thus cost imposition
alone cannot make a law unconstitutional. For another, the concern
of chilling effect doctrine is not with risk imposition per se, but with
how much speech actually gets produced. Speech will be chilled only
if its costs to the speaker outweigh its benefits.223 This determination necessarily entails identifying potential speakers and assessing
their subjective risk aversion.224
The court must then compare the two sides of the equation.
Courts do not always make this step explicit, but it undoubtedly
exists.225 Speech may be a preferred value, but it is not absolutely
preferred. If the existence of chilling always trumped other legitimate governmental interests, then all laws would be invalid.226
Inevitably, then, the finding of a chilling effect implies that the
benefits of the challenged rule are outweighed by the cost to free
expression.
Having identified an unacceptable chilling effect, the court must
remedy it through an alternative rule. To do this, it must perform

222. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 24-26 (asserting that it is impossible to value
information without being in possession of the information one is valuing).
223. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 9, at 698. Thus, for example, the Court has rejected
chilling arguments as applied to commercial speech because it believes that the incentives for
commercial actors to speak outweigh the risks imposed by imprecise regulations. See, e.g.,
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980).
224. See Schauer, supra note 110, at 286 (arguing that the actual malice standard was the
product of “speculation, not about the law itself, but about the newspaper industry, its
organization, and the incentives of its inhabitants”).
225. See Ely, supra note 1, at 1485 n.16 (rejecting the Court’s occasional suggestion that
“less drastic means analysis involves no balancing of interests whatever, but rather an almost
mechanical pruning of superfluous restraints.... That is good propaganda, but it does not
accurately reflect what was going on .... Of course the balancing is ‘at the margin,’ comparing
the incremental promotion of the interest on which the government relies with the
incremental threat to free expression.” (citations omitted)).
226. See Schauer, supra note 9, at 701 (“What we must look for is some way of determining
under what circumstances the inevitable chilling effect becomes great enough to require
judicial invalidation of legislative enactments.”).
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the cost-benefit analysis described above on a set of possible rules.
The court must then compare the outcomes for each rule and select
the one that strikes the optimal balance between alleviating chilling
and achieving other interests.
It is not sufficient to find that one alternative performs marginally better than the challenged rule. The logic of the chilling effect
is that, if any alternative rule achieves a better balance than the
rule at hand, then that alternative must be chosen. To select a suboptimal rule only leaves that new rule open to challenge. The implication is that the court should perform cost-benefit assessments for
all possible alternatives. The selection of a particular intent
requirement implies that it is the best remedy as compared not only
with the challenged rule but with all other possible rules.
Chilling effect analysis thus requires courts to make a great number of empirical assessments. Some of these are about the subjective
risk profiles of all affected speakers. Some are about what speech
would be chilled by a challenged rule or by any number of possible
alternatives. These counterfactual undertakings are staggering, to
say the least.227
Although courts routinely address difficult empirical questions,
those raised by the chilling effect may be particularly intractable.
Further investment in answering these questions may have limited
returns, particularly in terms of persuasive justifications for particular legal rules.
To summarize, the Supreme Court has founded the chilling effect
on nothing more than unpersuasive empirical guesswork. The
existing empirical literature casts further doubt on the Court’s
conclusions and, more importantly, illustrates the severe difficulties
that chilling effect inquiries present. To the extent that the chilling
effect is its only acceptable defense, the doctrinal importance of
speaker’s intent still lacks persuasive justification.
IV. A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE: BEYOND THE CHILLING EFFECT
We are left, then, with a dilemma. On one hand, the chilling effect
is the only legitimate justification for speaker’s intent require227. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 24-26 (arguing that measuring a law’s effects on
expression is impossible).
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ments.228 On the other hand, the empirical difficulties of the chilling
effect make it an implausible justification for the choice of a particular legal rule.229 The chilling effect must justify intent requirements, yet it cannot.
This problem is just one manifestation of the “dilemma of ignorance”: courts must judge the effects of regulation, but they are not
equipped to do so.230 The dilemma has a number of potential responses.231 One is to conclude that because something cannot be
measured, it should be ignored, at least in the construction of legal
doctrines and rules.232 This, however, would be a mistake. The fact
228. See Alexander, Speaker’s Intent, supra note 2, at 25; Alexander, Low Value Speech,
supra note 2, at 548; Schauer, supra note 2, at 217-23.
229. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 21-26; Schauer, supra note 110, at 286.
It will be noted that the same scholars who argue that the chilling effect is the only
legitimate justification for speaker’s intent are some of the most prominent critics of the
empirical basis of the chilling effect. These views are not necessarily inconsistent. For
Schauer’s part, although he has frankly acknowledged the shortcomings of judicial empirical
assessment, he has also advocated measures to increase judicial competence. See id. at 29294. For him, the chilling effect is the only possible legitimate justification for speaker’s intent
requirements, and any decision based on the chilling effect may require more effort than the
Supreme Court has historically given it. It follows that some existing intent requirements
may not be justified, but the problem going forward is not insurmountable.
Alexander’s position is more puzzling. He argues that speaker’s intent may only be used
prophylactically, to prevent chilling of protected speech. Alexander, Speaker’s Intent, supra
note 2, at 25. At the same time, however, he has argued forcefully that the types of
counterfactuals involved in such assessments are impossible. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1,
at 21-26, 188-90. Ultimately, Alexander concludes that, despite the empirical difficulties, we
may be suspicious of the chilling effects of content-based regulations, id. at 191-92, but we are
not equipped to forecast the incidental effects of other types of laws, id. at 188-90. This
resolution would allow reliance on the chilling effect to evaluate laws targeting unprotected
speech but would foreclose scrutiny of the incidental effects of content-neutral laws. It is not
clear that this dichotomous approach squares with Alexander’s insistence elsewhere that
speech effects are incalculable. See Alexander, Speaker’s Intent, supra note 2, at 21-26.
Alexander justifies evaluation of content-based laws on the grounds that the government may
well overuse content-based regulation and underestimate its impact on protected speech.
ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 191-92. But it is not clear why the government would not be
biased in the same ways elsewhere. The government might also overestimate the importance
of other regulatory objectives. And whether or not it does so, if it systematically
underestimates effects on protected expression in one context, it is not clear why it would not
do so in another.
230. Schauer, supra note 110, at 268-69; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 110, at 288-95 (discussing possible responses to the
empirical dilemma); see also Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain
Official Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 769, 778 n.53 (2010) (same).
232. Cf. Schauer, supra note 110, at 289-90 (explaining Justice Scalia’s view that the Court
should not involve itself in areas in which it has little expertise).
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that we cannot measure chilling effects accurately does not mean
that they do not exist. Nor does it mean that we should not care
about them. Under any theory holding that speech facilitates important individual or social values, chilling should be a constitutional
concern. To ignore chilling is to reject as a noninterest something
that under many First Amendment theories should count as an
imperative. The fact that we can fulfill such commitments only
imperfectly is not a good reason to deny them outright.233
Rather than ignoring chilling altogether, we might take other
approaches. First, legal observers and adjudicators might put their
rough empirical judgments to careful, pragmatic use.234 If, for
instance, the choice is between guessing that prohibiting murder
will deter murder and having no law against murder, we should
take the guess. For some laws, the risk of chilling might be so great
and so apparent that it is better to subject them to scrutiny on the
basis of rough empirical judgment than to leave them alone. Such
review is most salutary when accompanied by a candid recognition
of its epistemic limitations.235
Second, we might search for tools to help answer empirical questions, and courts might invest in such tools.236 This approach might
incorporate the views of experts, such as quantitative empirical
scholars or, in cases like Sullivan, people who understand the incen-

233. See TRIBE, supra note 1, § 16-20, at 1510-12 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
institutional objections to intrusive remedies should not be articulated as a rejection of a
conception of equality that considers the effects of laws); Leslie Kendrick, Disclosure and Its
Discontents, 27 J.L. & POL. 575, 576-77 (2012) (arguing that the difficulty of measuring effects
on speech should not foreclose efforts to do so); Schauer, supra note 231, at 778 n.53.
234. But see Schauer, supra note 231, at 778 n.53 (expressing doubts about relying on
“hunches as intuition” as compared with second-best empirical findings); Schauer, supra note
110, at 288.
235. Cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 259 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment) (arguing that if new information demonstrates a link between virtual child
pornography and difficulties in prosecuting actual child pornography distributors, then the
Court’s judgment should be revisited); Kendrick, supra note 233, at 595 (arguing for candor
when institutional limitations prevent courts from assessing speech effects).
236. See Schauer, supra note 110, at 292-95; Schauer, supra note 231, at 778 n.53.
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tives of the affected speakers.237 When empirical information later
shows that judgments were inaccurate, they should be revised.
Either of these approaches is superior to ignoring a problem
entirely, but each has its shortcomings. Rough empirical judgments
offer only soft justifications for particular legal rules.238 Useful empirical information is not always available, whether because certain
questions resist empirical methods or because detailed empirical
work is unlikely to keep pace with the demands placed on the legal
system.239 Both approaches are superior to ignoring constitutional
imperatives, but that hardly makes them ideal.
This Article has borne witness to their shortcomings in the case
of speaker’s intent. The first strategy was to accept existing judicial
limitations and analyze the chilling effect for consistency as a matter of rough judgment. The results did not inspire confidence in the
chilling effect as a justification.240 The second strategy was to turn
to more thorough empirical investigations. This effort failed to justify existing intent requirements and generally cast doubt on the
ability of empirical methods to set such requirements with precision
and accuracy.241
There is one last alternative: we might return to the original
premise, that the chilling effect is the only acceptable reason for
intent requirements. Perhaps this premise was unjustified. To the
extent that an interest in speaker’s intent seems correct, perhaps
the proper conclusion to draw from the inadequacy of the chilling
effect is that some other concern, or set of concerns, must explain
this interest. If, for instance, we think that strict liability for false
statements is intuitively wrong, perhaps this intuition is being
237. See Schauer, supra note 110, at 292-93. Schauer favorably distinguishes the possibility
of obtaining the views of experts not hired by the parties from the regular use of experts in
litigation. Id.
Yet another approach would involve deference to experts in a different vein: courts could
decide that thorny empirical questions are best left to legislators and defer to their judgments.
This approach may be a variant of the first approach mentioned above, wherein courts choose
to ignore empirical questions as a matter of judicial review. If a court’s conception of the First
Amendment demands a concern with chilling, this deferential stance might not be justified,
nor in the case of chilling is it obvious that legislators would be any better situated than
courts.
238. See supra Part II.
239. See supra Part III.B.
240. See supra Part II.
241. See supra Part III.
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driven not by a sense of the effects of strict liability on defense costs
—about which we know little—but by concerns other than chilling.
If the pattern of Supreme Court decisions is any indication, perhaps the same is true for the Court as well. In addressing chilling
in the defamation context, the Court has relied primarily on intent
requirements.242 As we have seen, however, if chilling is the sole
concern, damages rules and other legal tools are arguably better at
addressing it.243 Meanwhile, the Court has disregarded other, equally plausible instances of chilling, including the effects of its own
defamation remedy.244 One explanation for this pattern is that the
Court has intuitions more about the rightness of intent requirements than about the wrongness of chilling.
Such a pattern could arise, for example, out of substantive moral
considerations. In the case of defamation, we might think it wrong
to penalize a speaker for false statements made in good faith, not (or
not only) because penalizing him might chill other speakers but
because it seems unfair to the speaker at hand. Perhaps we have an
intuition that speakers who lack culpability for the harmful aspect
of their message ought not to face penalties for expression. Although
the Court never explicitly relied on such a view in Sullivan, it might
explain the doctrine better than the chilling rationale on which the
Court did rely.245
242. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
243. See supra Part I.B.2.
244. See supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
245. This interpretation of Supreme Court doctrine gains some support from the fact that
the Court began inquiring into speaker’s intent in the early incitement and subversive
advocacy cases long before it began to invoke chilling effect arguments. See, e.g., De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362-66 (1937) (invalidating a conviction when the defendant was not
proved to have subversive purpose); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258-59, 263-64 (1937)
(same); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386 (1927) (same); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 626 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (considering intent relevant to the question of
constitutional protection); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (same).
This focus on speaker’s intent began in Holmes’s discussion of criminal attempt in Schenck.
See id. For Holmes’s reliance on criminal attempt in his approach to subversive advocacy, see,
for example, Edward J. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the “Clear and Present Danger”
Theory of the First Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1128 (1989); David M. Rabban, The
Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1271-73 (1983); G.
Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The
Human Dimension, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 414-19, 435-36 (1992).
Holmes’s change of heart on subversive advocacy between Schenck and Abrams is well
documented. See generally Gunther, supra note 34; Rabban, supra; White, supra. His ultimate
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The final response, therefore, is to turn from questions of policy—
such as the deterrent and protective aspects of rules—to questions
of principle.246 If the chilling effect does not offer a satisfactory
account of speaker’s intent, and if we nevertheless find intent requirements an intuitive aspect of law, then it is worth considering
whether we might construct an account by which intent matters in
its own right. It is quite possible, of course, that no account can justify all existing intent requirements, given the inconsistencies that
bedeviled the chilling effect account in Part II. But before rejecting
intent requirements as unjustified, we might see whether a different
set of arguments can do a better job—perhaps even an affirmatively
good job—of explaining them.247
This principled approach will not eliminate questions of policy.
But given the difficulty of such questions, we might begin with
matters of principle and see how far they might resolve legal quandaries.248 Given such priority, the principled approach is not an
outright replacement for the policy response but a privileged counterpart to it.249 Such a pluralistic approach may take account of
position on intent is more contested. See Gunther, supra note 34, at 737 (“What ‘intent’ had
to do with a constitutional test purportedly focusing on the consequences of speech was never
made clear, here [in Abrams] or in later cases.”). Compare Bloustein, supra, at 1143-45
(arguing that Abrams best articulated Holmes’s view of criminal attempt from The Common
Law), with Rabban, supra, at 1306 (arguing that the earlier cases reflected Holmes’s view of
criminal attempt, from which Abrams was a departure). In any case, it seems clear that the
Court’s original interest in intent had its roots, if not its ultimate justification, in an analogy
to liability for attempt in criminal law.
246. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33-103 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-88 (1978) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]
(arguing that policy questions are better suited for majoritarian bodies, whereas courts find
their proper role in determining matters of principle); see also Schauer, supra note 110, at
290-91 (discussing Dworkin’s view).
247. Alexander and Schauer obviously had reasons for concluding that intent can only
function prophylactically. See Alexander, Speaker’s Intent, supra note 2, at 23-25; Schauer,
supra note 2, at 217-21; see also supra Part I. I do not imagine that redoubled efforts on the
substantive side would persuade them that their conclusions were amiss. What this Article
has attempted to emphasize, however, is that such conclusions are inherently relative: the
chilling effect may be a better account in their views, but it has its own problems. For other
scholars, these problems may be extensive enough to warrant new efforts toward a
substantive account.
248. See Kendrick, supra note 233, at 595 (questions of principle should take priority over
epistemic problem of measuring speech effects).
249. But see DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 246, at 82-85 (arguing that
courts should act primarily on the basis of principle). Dworkin’s view stems largely from a
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both moral commitments and deterrence values.250 Many First
Amendment theories explicitly rely on both.251 For instance, an
autonomy perspective might understand free speech values as both
respecting and facilitating our capacities as autonomous moral
agents. A democratic self-governance theory might oppose those
restrictions that show disregard for our role as citizens and those
that impede the democratic process. Such theories will regard some
restrictions as impermissible as a matter of principle and others
suspect as a matter of policy. Where, as here, policy analysis fails to
justify existing doctrine, we must ask whether a principled account
would do. In this case, this approach may point toward the construction of an alternative account of speaker’s intent.252
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that the chilling effect, as it currently exists, provides an inadequate answer to the question of
speaker’s intent. In doing so, I have identified problems that may
beset other empirical judgments in law making. I have argued that
conviction that the countermajoritarian nature of courts makes them inappropriate
policymakers. This approach risks overemphasizing the countermajoritarian aspect of courts
at the expense of a number of realities: the facts that many legal standards require courts to
traffic in policy questions, that they otherwise may not be any worse equipped for some such
questions than legislatures, and that they have in any case been deciding many of them for
quite some time. Cf. Schauer, supra note 110, at 295-97 (arguing against allowing the
countermajoritarian difficulty to overwhelm other aspects of institutional design).
250. Pluralistic approaches are also common, if controversial, in other areas, such as tort
and criminal law. For example, Kenneth Abraham has argued that deterrence and fairness
values constrain each other in negligence law. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in
Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 271, 273-74 (2012). Douglas Laycock has offered a pluralistic
description of the doctrine of undue hardship. See Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of
Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L.,
no. 3, 2012, at 1, 35 (“The doctrine in this area suggests that the judges care about righting
wrongs and they also care about instrumental values.”). Paul Robinson has argued that
pursuit of deterrence goals in criminal law may be constrained by individuals’ sense of the law
and, hence, of justice. See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 221, at 983-87.
251. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 127-46 (discussing various justifications for
freedom of speech).
252. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 18, at 597-606 (noting the weaknesses of the deterrencebased account of the exclusionary rule and attempting a more principled justification); cf.
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2002-03 (2007) (arguing
that the deterrence-based account fails to make sense of many features of negligence law and
accordingly offering an alternative account).
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the best response to these problems is a pluralistic one, in which we
seek both to improve our understanding of the relevant empirical
claims and to consider accounts based on principle.
With regard to the problem of speaker’s intent, this latter response suggests that we might consider justifications focused on the
culpability of speakers, rather than the chilling of their speech. This
approach may have its own difficulties, but given the weakness of
the chilling effect, and the persistence of speaker’s intent as a feature of the law, it is at least worth the attempt.

